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Abstract 
The problem of political obligation is the question of what justifies our obedience 
to the laws imposed upon us by a political authority, or alternatively, what makes a civil 
condition necessary. In this thesis, I provide an answer to this question through a study of 
Immanuel Kant’s theory of right in his Metaphysics of Morals. My main claim is that, 
from a Kantian perspective, a civil condition is necessary we take ourselves to be rational 
beings. The crucial concept by which Kant establishes the necessity of a civil condition is 
the concept of freedom as independence from being constrained by another’s choice. 
First, I argue that the concept of freedom is a demand of the very principle of our 
rational, free agency. I then show that a civil condition is necessary for our innate right to 
freedom. 
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Introduction1 
As members of a political community, we find many aspects of our everyday lives 
conditioned by a system of laws enforced or imposed upon us by a political authority. 
What reasons do we have for obeying such a system? This question, known as the 
problem of ‘political obligation,’ can also be formulated in part as the question of how we 
are to justify the necessity of a state, or, in a more classical version of the question, how 
are we to justify leaving “the state of nature” in favor of a public authority and a legal 
system, that is, a civil condition? With this thesis, I intend to explain Immanuel Kant’s 
argument for the necessity of political authority for a community of human beings living 
together. In short, I will argue that Kant’s answer is that entering a civil condition is 
necessary because of our being rational, free agents.  
Kant’s justification of political obligation in the ‘Doctrine of Right’ [Rechtslehre], 
later published as the first division of his Metaphysics of Morals, is not an instrumentalist 
theory. That is, by his account, political authority is not required merely because it comes 
with some benefits that result in a better condition of life.2 My claim is that a civil 
condition is necessary for human life because we are rational, free agents. Our being 
                                                
1. I would like to thank two anonymous readers for their constructive comments on the first 
version of this thesis. 
2. For a brief comparison between Kant’s political philosophy and other utilitarian and Lockean 
approaches cf. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), Ch. 1.  
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rational, free agents requires an innate right to freedom, i.e. a right to have our actions 
determined by ourselves and not by others. This innate right to freedom requires 
establishing a civil condition.  
The key notion in establishing such a necessity is the concept of freedom 
understood as the “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MM 
6:237/393).3 As I aim to demonstrate, this dimension of freedom has various and crucial 
functions in Kant’s overall argument for the necessity of the civil condition, and can 
serve as the key notion by which we can understand the claim that a civil condition is 
necessary because of our being rational, free agents. Simply put, freedom in its external 
dimension cannot be consistently enacted without a public legal system. As Arthur 
Ripstein rightly insists, legal and political institutions, for Kant, are not “merely causal 
conditions to bring about the realization of the right to freedom,” but are instead the 
condition of the possibility for the exercise of our right to freedom.4 
This conception of freedom understood as the independence from being 
constrained by another’s choice (MM 6:237/393) is crucial to the Doctrine of Right. 
According to Kant, this is “freedom in the external use of choice” (MM 6:214/375).5 It 
should be noted here that in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant sometimes refer to this 
                                                
3. The numbers before the slash refer to the standard academy page numbers. Those after the slash 
refer to the pages of the translations.  
4. Ibid., 9. 
5. Unless noted, any emphasis is in the original texts.  
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conception of freedom as “outer freedom” [Äussere Freiheit].6 For this reason, when it 
comes to the discussion of Kant’s theory of right and political philosophy, many 
commentators use the expression “outer freedom” or “external freedom” in a purely 
functional sense without implying an ontological distinction.7 In the Doctrine of Right, 
Kant mostly uses “freedom” without modifying it with “external.” Therefore, I use it only 
in a functional sense and as shorthand for “freedom in the external use of choice” (MM 
6:214/375).8 
The concept of freedom in the Doctrine of Right has the function of overcoming 
the inevitable empirical limitations of human beings. Freedom is required to overcome 
another’s interference with our decisions, since a natural condition of human beings is 
that we live together. Kant refers to this external limitation in the Natural Right Course 
Lectures: “The will of a human being is not limited by even the whole of nature except 
by means of the wills of other human beings” (F 27:1319). In the Doctrine of Right, the 
duties of human beings are determined with regard to the natural condition that is their 
                                                
6. For example, cf. MM 6:380/513 in which he asserts that the doctrine of right deals only with 
“the formal condition of outer freedom.” Also, in MM 6:406/534, he refers to the duties of right as “the 
duties of outer freedom,” while ethical duties are understood as “the duties of inner freedom.” Cf. also MM 
6:254/408 and 6:396/526. 
7. For example, cf. Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 80-82 and Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern 
Political Philosophy, Ch. 3, in which she discusses “the morality of external freedom” and the distinction 
between internal and external freedom. Cf. also Jennifer K. Uleman’s discussion about the concept of 
external freedom and its relationship with freedom of will and internal freedom in her “External Freedom 
in Kant's "Rechtslehre": Political, Metaphysical,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, no. 3 
(2004): 578-601.  
8. Hereafter, when I use “external freedom,” I merely mean what Kant understands as “freedom in 
the external use of choice,” which is “independence from being constrained by another’s choice.” Using 
this expression, I do not mean that external freedom is ontologically different from internal freedom. 
Rather, using the expression of “external” is only for the sake of clarity, to refer to freedom in Kant’s 
Doctrine of Right.  
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living together. It is inevitable for human beings to interact with each other, and thus to 
influence each others’ actions. Consequently, Kant aims to show what actions are right 
when it comes to our reality of living with and amongst one another. It is in this context 
that Kant provides his argument for the necessity of entering a civil condition. My broad 
intention is to argue that a civil condition is a necessary as a demand of rational, free 
agency, using the concept of freedom we find in the Metaphysics of Morals.  
To explain Kant’s complex argument in the Doctrine of Right with a focus on the 
role of freedom in the external use of choice does not amount to overlooking other 
important concepts. On the contrary, due to the systematic character of Kant’s work, any 
understanding of one concept requires showing its relationship to many others. 
Specifically, with regards to the concept of freedom, the concepts of right and possession 
are of particular importance. In explaining Kant’s argument in this way, we shall see that 
freedom in the external use of choice may serve as a nexus for Kant’s non-instrumentalist 
political philosophy.  
Kant’s own argument for this necessity takes up only one page of the first section 
of “Private Right.” Here, Kant argues that rightful possession—a condition necessary for 
our freedom in the external use of choice—is possible only by and within a civil 
condition. On the face of it, it is not clear how possession could be related to the concept 
of freedom, let alone the nature of rational, free agency. That is, possession, according to 
the contemporary view, seems to be an empirical concept having nothing to do with 
human rational character. Kant’s exposition of the human beings’ right to choose and act 
freely gives us a clue to interpret this right as a demand of rational, free agency. As such, 
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in order to understand Kant’s contention that a civil condition is necessary for us to have 
possession, I think, we must investigate the link between rational, free agency, freedom 
in the external use of choice, and possession.  
To show that a civil condition is necessary because we are rational, free beings, I 
begin in the first chapter, by showing that the crucial concept of freedom—which is the 
keystone concept to justify the necessity of a civil condition—can be derived from a 
Kantian theory of rational, free agency. Emphasising the role of practical reason as the 
faculty that issues ends and rules for rational beings, I derive freedom in the external use 
of choice as a rational demand if we are to comply with the dictates of our reason. My 
claim is that we cannot rationally accept that we can be constrained by another’s choice. 
The first chapter thus shows that freedom in the external use of choice, is a demand of 
our rational agency. 
I then argue that what makes a civil condition necessary is human being’s innate 
right to freedom. In the first section of chapter two, my claim is that freedom in the 
external use of choice has a twofold role in Kant’s account of the concept of right. 
Through the exposition of the Universal Principle of Right, Kant suggests a criterion for 
the rightfulness of actions. I argue that this criterion is freedom in the external use of 
choice. As for the second role, freedom is the concept through which the authorization to 
coerce—which Kant claims to be connected with the Universal Principle of Right—can 
be justified. I then turn to the crucial concept of possession as a demand of freedom, as 
Kant proposes in the much-discussed “Postulate of Practical Reason with Regards to 
Rights.” Having established the necessity of possession according to this Postulate, Kant 
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goes on to show that the right to possession cannot be consistent with our external 
exercise of freedom unless there exists a public lawgiving authority, that is, a civil 
condition. Through this analysis of the role of the notion of freedom for the necessity of 
possession, I come to this conclusion that a civil condition is necessary because we are 
rational, free agents.  
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Chapter One 
External freedom and Rational Agency 
Introduction 
In the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant emphasizes some 
significant aspects of his theory of right. He first underscores the metaphysical aspect of 
the work in that it contains “a system of a priori cognition from concepts alone” (MM 
6:216/371). This reveals that his theory of right is not an empirical investigation; rather it 
consists of concepts and principles that are derived independently from experience. 
However, he points out to a second character of the work as being at the same time an 
“application” of such a priori principles. By this application, he intends to take into 
account “the particular nature of human beings” that can be cognized by experience. 
Further in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, he makes clearer what he 
understands as the particular nature of human beings. His theory of right, as part of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, contains those a priori concepts that relate to the natural 
condition of human beings as beings that live together and have interaction with each 
other. The concept of right, he asserts, has only to do with external and practical relation 
of one person to another (MM 6:230/387). Then he suggests a principle that regulates this 
external relation of human beings with each other as the Universal Principle of Right, 
which contains a definition of the rightfulness of actions. My complete analysis of this 
Principle and the concept of right is in the second chapter of this thesis. Here for the 
purpose of the present chapter—which is to derive the concept of external freedom from 
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a Kantian theory of rational agency—it suffices to say that what serves as the criterion of 
the rightfulness of actions is the concept of external freedom defined as “the 
independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MM 6:237/393). This means 
that actions are right if they can coexist with everyone’s freedom.  
 The conceptions of freedom familiar from Kant’s other major works are the 
freedom of will as being independent from the determinations of natural causality and 
from inclinations and desires. One might wonder where the concept of external freedom, 
which is crucial in the Doctrine of Right, comes from and why we should be externally 
free.  
In the Metaphysics of Morals, one cannot find an answer for why we can claim 
that we should be externally free, except for a brief clue that Kant provides when he 
asserts that freedom in the external use of choice is the right belonging to a human being 
“by virtue of his humanity” (MM 6:237/393), which for Kant means by virtue of his 
personality independent from physical attributes. Using this brief clue, in this chapter, I 
suggest that Kant’s theory of rational, free agency, explained in his earlier works—
including the Critique of Pure Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals—can serve as a foundation for deriving the concept of external freedom—a 
concept which is then essential for Kant’s theory of right and eventually for his 
justification of the demand to enter a civil condition. 
My analysis of external freedom (freedom in the external use of choice) as a 
demand of Kantian rational, free agency, I argue, can serve as an answer to the question 
of why we have a right to freedom. In the first section, I begin by explaining Kant’s 
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meaning of humanity as human beings’ personality independent from physical attributes. 
Then, I explore the root of this understanding of human beings in the Third Antinomy of 
the first Critique, where we can find a Kantian theory of rational, free agency or what he 
calls “the causality of reason.” I intend to show that reason produces rules and 
imperatives freely from any natural determination from without. Then in the second 
section, I argue that external freedom (freedom in the external use of choice) is required 
for our actions if we are to comply with the necessities imposed by hypothetical 
imperatives as the rules issued by our reason. My claim is that we cannot rationally 
accept that we can be constrained by another’s choice, if we are to comply with the 
necessities we make for ourselves through hypothetical imperatives. If I am correct in this 
suggestion, we can conclude that external freedom is necessary because we are rational, 
free agents.  
The Causality of Reason: Kant’s Account of Rational, Free Agency 
Freedom as independence from being constrained by another’s choice, as we shall 
see, plays an important role in the formulation of the Universal Principle of Right. One is 
free insofar as one has decided for oneself what actions one wants to perform to achieve 
one’s ends. However, it is not yet clear why Kant thinks that we have this right in the first 
place. In the Doctrine of Right, Kant provides a short yet significant clue. He writes that 
the exercise of freedom is “the only original right belonging to every human being by 
virtue of his humanity” (MM 6:237/393 [emphasis added]). But what is it about humanity 
that makes it such that those beings who are characterized by it have a right to exercise 
their capacity to freely choose actions in order to achieve ends?  
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In the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, Kant asserts that  
[i]n the doctrine of duties a human being can and should be represented in 
terms of his capacity for freedom, which is wholly supersensible, and so 
too merely in terms of his humanity, his personality independent of 
physical attributes (homo noumenon), as distinguished from the same 
subject represented as affected by physical attributes, a human being 
(homo phaenomenon) (MM 6:239/395).9 
In other words, the capacity for freedom is related to the intelligible (supersensible) 
character of human beings, as opposed to their sensible character. This is in line with 
Kant’s assertion that the innate right to freedom belongs to human beings by virtue of 
their humanity, which in light of the above passage can be taken as the claim that the 
innate right to freedom is related to the intelligibility of human beings. However, what is 
not clear is how they are related to each other. The above reference to the 
intelligible/sensible distinction leads us to Kant’s theory of “the causality of reason” in 
the resolution to the Third Antinomy.10  
                                                
9. Similar references to humanity as equivalent with noumenal aspect of human beings can also be 
seen in MM 6:418/544, 6:379/512, 6:423/547, and 6:429/552.  
10. In the following reading of Kant’s theory of rational agency, mainly based on the resolution of 
the Third Antinomy, I follow Henry Allison’s interpretation of the text in his Kant’s Theory of Freedom 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Also, Cf. Allison, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 149-175. Not all commentators agree 
with Allison’s interpretation here. For a criticism of his interpretation and an entirely different account of 
the role of humanity, cf. Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, Ch. 2 & 3. Regardless of the 
details of his interpretation, Allison’s emphasis on Kant’s “causality of reason” provides a ground, I argue, 
for the external concept of freedom. 
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An explanation of the intelligibility/sensibility distinction can be found in the 
Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason.11 Here, Kant endeavors to resolve an 
apparent conflict between causality and freedom. The Third Antinomy details a conflict 
between two opposing claims about the transcendental idea of freedom. By the 
transcendental idea of freedom, Kant means “an absolute causal spontaneity beginning 
from itself a series of appearances” (CPR A446/B474). Kant regards the transcendental 
idea of freedom as the “real ground” of the imputability of the practical concept of 
freedom, or human freedom of the will. He thinks that, regarding the question of freedom 
of the will, what is puzzling for speculative philosophy is to accept “a faculty of 
beginning a series of successive things or states from itself,” and this faculty is exactly 
what he means by the transcendental idea of freedom. (CPR A448/B476). Kant regards 
this conflict as a threat of speculative reason against the moral use of reason. The moral 
use of reason, he claims, needs to be secured against any possible contradiction regarding 
the concept of freedom (CPR BXXV). 
                                                
11. The antinomies are dialectical conflicts of reason with itself when it comes to the problems 
about the cosmological idea of the “world,” understood as the total of all appearances (CPR A420/B447). 
The Third Antinomy addresses the problem of whether it suffices to explain the idea of “world” with the 
concept of natural causality, as governing everything in appearances, or we need to assume a first 
beginning cause that is not itself caused by a further cause (that is, a free cause). Thus, he introduces his 
account of freedom in the context of a cosmological problem. A full elaboration of the Third Antinomy 
goes beyond the scope of this research. In what follows, I mostly focus on its resolution, as this is where the 
implications for the problem of human free will can be found. More specifically, I focus on his theory of 
“the causality of reason.” For Kant’s systematic explanation of how reason unavoidably ends up with such 
conflicts and his resolutions, cf. CPR A405/B432 – A567/B595. Also, in his other works, Kant refers to the 
same resolution. For example, cf. CprR 5:48-50/178-180, 5:65, and G 4:451-452/98-99. For an analysis of 
the antinomies and the dialectic of reason, cf. Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 172-214; Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An 
Interpretation and Defense, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 357-395; and Andrews Reath, 
“Kant’s Critical Account of Freedom,” in A Companion to Kant, ed. Graham Bird, (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010), 275-290.   
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One side of the conflict affirms the necessity of an idea of freedom, while the 
other denies the possibility of freedom by claiming that “everything in the world happens 
solely in accordance with laws of nature” (CPR A444/B472; A445/B473). When it comes 
to the issue of human freedom of the will, the thesis of the Antinomy asserts that freedom 
can be attributed to human will. This means that human will can start a series of actions 
from itself, without being determined by anything external to itself. The antithesis, 
however, claims that since everything, including human will, is governed by the laws of 
causality, attributing freedom to human will would be inconsistent with the universality 
of causality.  
Kant importantly sides with neither thesis nor antithesis. Instead, he attempts to 
resolve the conflict by finding a way to claim that both are true. The way he finds is to 
claim that both are true if they are assessed from different perspectives. In their 
“empirical” or “sensible” character, human beings—like other appearances in the 
world—are subject to the causal connections that govern the “world of sense” (CPR 
A540/B568). On the other hand, in their intelligible character, they “have to be declared 
free of all influences of sensibility… independent and free of all the natural necessity 
present solely in the world of sense” (CPR A541/B569). He thus concludes that “freedom 
and nature, each in its full significance, would both be found in the same actions, 
simultaneously and without any contradiction, according to whether one compares them 
with their intelligible or their sensible cause.” Thus, the problem of free will, Kant 
argues, can be resolved if we take these two perspectives into account. Human will is free 
from causal determinations because it belongs to the intelligible character of human 
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being, while at the same time the actions stemming from that will are subject to natural 
laws because they belong to the sensible character of human beings.  
In its specifically intelligible freedom from the laws of nature, human will, 
according to Kant, operates according to its own kind of causality, one that differs from 
natural causality. Indeed, in the very formulation of the conflict, Kant refers to freedom 
as a kind of causality of its own (CPR A444/B472), indicating that freedom has its own 
laws. He proceeds to give an account of “the causality of reason.”12 To use one of Kant’s 
examples, when a person voluntarily lies, one way to investigate her lie is to consider the 
probable sources of her action. These sources may include her bad upbringing, the bad 
company she keeps, her character as careless, or even the wickedness of her temper (CPR 
A554/B582). In considering these “empirical characters,” according to Kant, one 
investigates “the series of determining causes for a given natural effect,” which in this 
case is her will to lie. However, no matter how we deem her lie to be influenced by the 
circumstances of her life, we still blame her, as if the agent herself is the source of the 
series of consequences that follow from the lie. When we blame an agent—or in other 
words, when we impute her actions to her—we regard reason itself as “a cause that, 
regardless of all the empirical conditions…could have and ought to have determined the 
                                                
12. When he uses the notion of “reason,” Kant often understands it as having either “speculative” 
or “practical” meaning. Setting aside whether the difference is plausible, in what follows I use “reason” in 
its practical function. A further terminological clarification worth mentioning is that for Kant “practical 
reason” and “will” are one and the same thing (G 4:412/66; MM 6:213/375): practical reason is reason 
insofar as its function is to produce actions in the world. It should also be noted that Allison’s account of 
rational agency is not limited to practical agency: it also goes to the speculative function of reason. But here 
I will concentrate on practical reason and thus addressing rational agency mostly from the practical point of 
view. 
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conduct of the person to be other than it is” (CPR A555/B583). In this way, we ascribe 
the actions to the agent’s intelligible character, that is, her reason. Without ascribing this 
alternative kind of causality to our rational, intelligible characters, we would be unable to 
impute actions to the agent as a being endowed with reason, and thus we would not be 
able to understand her as responsible for her actions. And without this possibility of 
imputability, the whole domain of morality becomes impossible to think. This example 
thus shows that to assert that human beings are free is equivalent to saying that human 
reason operates according to its own kind of causality: reason is the cause of our actions, 
but itself is not causally determined by empirical, sensible conditions.   
To explain this account of the causality of reason, Kant’s distinction between will 
and choice needs to be considered. In the resolution of the Third Antinomy, Kant uses the 
notion of “the power of choice” [Willkür] as distinct from “practical reason,” the latter 
term taken to be equivalent with “will” [Wille].13 Practical reason, Kant defines, is reason 
considered as the cause that produces our actions and proposes imperatives “as rules to 
our powers of execution in everything practical” (CPR A547/B575). This power of 
execution is the power of choice, as he later adds that “reason exhibits a rule, in 
accordance with which one could… estimate the subjective principles of his power of 
choice” (CPR A549/B577). In other words, an agent acts according to a principle that she 
makes for her action. But this principle, in its own turn, is caused by practical reason, or 
                                                
13. The same distinction is made in MM 6:213/375. It should be noted that Kant does not use these 
terms coherently throughout his works. For example, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he often uses the 
term will without distinguishing it from choice.  
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equivalently is formed according to the rules given by practical reason that is itself free 
from being determined from without. For example, imagine my action is that I am 
reading a book. In this account, the principle I have made for myself—using Kant’s 
terms, the principle produced by my power of choice— is that ‘I shall read this book.’ 
This principle, in its own turn, is produced according to a rule given by myself—again 
using Kant’s terms, the rule is issued by my practical reason. The rule produced for me 
by my practical reason in this case would be “I ought to read this book.”  
This leads to an account of human rationality by which reason has two functions: 
one, in not being determined from without, it gives rules for effects it ought to produce; 
and the other, based on its self-generated rules, it generates executive principles that in 
turn produce actions. The power of choice [Willkür] that produces subjective principles 
for action is determined by the imperatives of practical reason. These subjective 
principles for actions Kant later calls maxims as distinct from the rules given by reason 
(G 4:402/56).14 The maxim is a principle for action that an agent makes for herself and 
can be in accordance with rules given by reason.  
I used the example of reading a book to emphasise that practical reason in this 
account is not limited to produce merely moral laws. The rule that ‘I ought to read this 
book’ is not a moral law. This is important because when it comes to his account of free 
will, Kant is usually interpreted as giving an account of moral laws and moral laws alone. 
Although the example of the agent who lies regards moral law, the Third Antimony is by 
                                                
14. Cf. also MM 6:225/379. 
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no means limited to ethics. As emphasized by Allison, this account of free agency 
includes all practical matters, not only moral laws.15 Kant explicitly refers to practical 
reason as giving general rules, orders, and imperatives which produce series of actions in 
general, without limiting it merely to moral laws such as ‘one ought not lie.’ Reason 
produces imperatives of any kind, not merely moral laws. 
Regardless of their differences, all imperatives and rules given by reason have an 
important characteristic in common that is crucial to understanding Kantian rational, free 
agency. When reason commands a particular imperative, it necessitates an action, 
meaning that reason-generated imperatives accompanies a practical necessity. In the 
Groundwork, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of imperatives.16 Categorical 
imperatives are unconditional, as they represent the necessity of an action insofar as it is 
good in itself, not in order to achieve some additional end outside the action itself. Moral 
laws such as “one ought not to lie” are categorical, since their good does not lie in some 
end outside themselves. In contrast, hypothetical imperatives represent the necessity of an 
action as a means to something else (G 4:414/67).17 Using Kant’s own example, an 
imperative such as ‘one ought to save money when you are young so as not to be in need 
when you are old’ represents the necessity of saving money only to achieve another end 
(CprR 5:20/154). Despite the difference between them, both categorical and hypothetical 
                                                
15. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom. 36.  
16. Cf. also CprR 5:20-21/154-155 and MM 6:222/377. 
17. In CprR 5:20/154, Kant calls hypothetical imperatives precepts, and in G 4:416/69, he divides 
them into rules of skill (technical imperatives) and counsels of prudence (pragmatic imperatives). But all 
these imperatives are common in that they all necessitates an action. 
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imperatives make an action necessary, as they both come with a practical necessity. That 
is, a categorical imperative is unconditionally and universally necessary precisely 
because it does not aim towards an end other than itself, while a hypothetical imperative 
makes an action necessary for the agents who make a particular end for themselves. 
Categorical imperatives are so necessary that complying with them often requires 
resistance against our opposing inclinations.18 The necessary nature of hypothetical 
imperatives can also be observed in the fact that sometimes in complying with them, we 
find ourselves having opposing inclinations. To return to the example of reading a book, 
the hypothetical imperative can be ‘you ought to read this book in order to pass the 
exam.’ In complying with this order, I might be required to resist a strong opposing 
inclination to go hiking with friends. Therefore, both categories of rules, insofar as they 
are given by reason, are the same in their being experienced as necessary.  
So far, we have seen that the human will, or in other words practical reason, 
produces imperatives that make some actions practically necessary. In producing such 
imperatives, the will is free in the sense that we cannot find a natural determining cause 
that necessitates the will to produce such imperatives. As Kant avers, no matter how 
many natural grounds we find that might affect the will, those grounds “cannot produce 
the ought” (CPR A548/B576).19 
                                                
18. This is a famous contention of Kantian moral philosophy Cf. G 4:396-400/51-55.  
19. Kant also explains that the freedom of the will has two meanings that mutually support each 
other: the negative meaning is independence from empirical conditions, while the positive meaning is that 
the will begins a series of occurrences from itself (CPR A553/B581). These two meanings of freedom are 
contained in the concept of “the freedom of will” or “human practical freedom.” 
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My emphasis in this account of rational, free agency is on that both categorical 
and hypothetical imperatives are freely produced by human will. One question that must 
be addressed is “what is required if an agent is to comply with these imperatives?” In the 
next section, focusing on the hypothetical imperatives, I argue that our compliance with 
imperatives issued by our reason would lead us to the external function of freedom as 
independence from being constrained by another’s choice.  
External Freedom as a Demand of Rational Agency 
We saw that the will gives itself rules and orders in the form of imperatives that in 
turn make some actions appear to us to be practically necessary. I emphasized that Kant’s 
account of the causality of reason suggests that every kind of imperative, including a 
hypothetical imperative, is freely issued by reason. Reading hypothetical imperatives as 
products of reason that at the same time aim towards specific end leads to an account of 
ends-oriented actions that are still explained by the causality of reason. External freedom 
(freedom in the external use of choice), I argue, can be derived as a demand of this 
account of how we are to comply with hypothetical imperatives. 
Based on the account of the causality of reason explained above, reason freely 
gives hypothetical imperatives for whatever ends we desire.20 Hypothetical imperatives 
                                                
20. I should emphasise that the claim that even hypothetical imperatives, which aim towards an 
end, are freely issued by reason does not contradict the fact that in producing ends, we are affected by our 
desires and inclinations. The point is that no matter how much we are affected by our desires to produce 
ends and hypothetical imperatives, we have still produced them freely in the sense that the very production 
of such imperatives cannot be explained by natural causality—which is the fundamental outcome of the 
resolution to the Third Antinomy. Even in the extreme example of the criminal I have mentioned above, 
Kant contends that the criminal has made the principle of her action freely. This freedom of the will is what 
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are those that command us to act in a specific and particular way to achieve the specific 
ends we set for ourselves. As Allison asserts, if I want to conceive of myself as a free 
agent, I should also regard myself as “pursuing ends that I frame for myself and I regard 
as rational to pursue.”21 These imperatives, as I explained, make an action appear to 
reason as being practically necessary.  
In the Groundwork, in which he mostly focuses on moral laws as categorical 
imperatives, Kant surprisingly gives a brief account of how the practical necessity arising 
from hypothetical imperatives is possible. Here, Kant appeals to what Kenneth Westphal 
calls “the Principle of Rational Willing,”22 according to which rational willing of an end 
requires rational willing of the means:  
Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence 
on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that are within his 
power (G 4:417/70).23  
                                                                                                                                            
makes it possible for us to blame the criminal, even though the end and the corresponding hypothetical 
imperative she has made for herself was affected by her desires, whatever they might have been.   
21. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 41. 
22. Kenneth R. Westphal, “A Kantian Justification of Possession,” in Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Morals: Interpretative Essays, edited by Mark Timmons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 97. 
23. This principle in the context of Kant’s theory of right is emphasised by Guyer and Westphal. 
Guyer refers to this principle as “the canon of rationality that underlies all of Kant’s claims about 
contradictions in willing.” Cf. Paul Guyer, “Kant’s Deduction of the Principles of Right,” in Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, ed. Mark Timmons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 57. Both Guyer and Westphal uses the principle in the context of Kant’s discussion of the concept of 
possession. But as I shall explain, this principle does not refer to “means” as merely external objects 
required to achieve ends. I follow Westphal in calling the principle “the Principle of Rational Willing.” For 
Allison’s detailed discussion of this principle, cf. Allison, Kant’s Groundwork, 157-166. 
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Kant then explains that this principle is analytic: “in the volition of an object as my 
effect… the use of means is already thought, and the [hypothetical] imperatives extract 
the concept of actions necessary to this end merely from the concept of a volition of this 
end” (G 4:417/70). He finally adds that “when I know that only by such an action can the 
proposed effects take place, then it is an analytic proposition that if I fully will the effect I 
also will the action requisite to it” (G 4:417/70).   
There are some points in this principle that help us to understand Kant’s account 
of hypothetical imperatives. By asserting that “reason has decisive influence on actions” 
and that it “fully wills the effect,” Kant shows that hypothetical imperatives make an 
action necessary when the agent decisively wills to achieve an end. This is evident from 
the fact that we do not actually act to achieve an end unless we have made a firm decision 
to do so. This observation is captured by Kant’s emphasis on the decisive influence of 
reason on our actions. Another significant point is that my knowledge of the 
indispensably necessary means is a condition of the possibility of willing those means. If 
I will some end, I also will the necessary means and actions for that end, but only if I am 
aware that some specific means are required to achieve the end. Finally, Kant’s 
contention that the principle is analytic means that willing an end without willing the 
necessary means is contradictory.  
Taking these points into account, and following Allison’s reformulation, we can 
rephrase the principle as “if an agent fully wills an end and knows that a means is 
indispensably necessary for that end and the means is in her power, then the agent wills 
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the means.”24 To explain more, as Allison suggests,25 assume that an agent (fully) wills 
an end. Then she would ask herself ‘what should I do to achieve my desired end?’ The 
ground of asking this question is asserted in the principle as “willing the indispensably 
necessary means” to achieve the end. In other words, the agent is asking about the 
required means to achieve the end. Simply put, an agent cannot will an end without 
willing the required means and actions to achieve it. This is when the agent forms a 
hypothetical imperative: “In order to achieve the end that I desire, I should do such and 
such.”26 Hence, the Principle of Rational Willing is what explains the possibility of 
hypothetical imperatives.  
Now to see how this principle can explain the practical necessitation of 
hypothetical imperatives, as Allison argues, we can also assign a prescriptive role to this 
principle.27 Since the agent wills an end and knows the indispensably necessary means to 
achieve the end, she tells herself: “Since I want that end and this action is the 
indispensably necessary action to that end, I must do this action.” This prescriptive form 
of the Principle of Rational Willing that the agent makes for herself is what necessitates 
her to enact the required actions to achieve her end.  
                                                
24. Cf. Allison, Kant’s Groundwork, 161.   
25. Ibid., 163.  
26. Once again, I should emphasise that in forming such an imperative, the agent obviously is 
affected by her desires. However, the very willing of an end, and thus producing such an imperative, cannot 
be explained by natural laws of causality, which for Kant means that the agent freely produces the end and 
the imperative. 
27. For his explanation of the prescriptivity and normativity of this principle, cf. Ibid., 162.  
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Let us analyze this explanation of the possibility and the necessity of hypothetical 
imperatives in light of the account of rational, free agency explained in the previous 
section. Such an analysis leads us to a derivation of the concept of external freedom. We 
saw that reason gives imperatives of any kind to an agent, which simply means that an 
agent in her reason’s imposition of any rule or imperative, is free from being naturally 
determined. The agent’s end in the example of reading a book could be her passing the 
exam. Then she asks, “what should I do to achieve that end?” Her answer to this question 
is the hypothetical imperative produced by herself: “you should read this book in order to 
pass the exam.” What is presupposed here, and what makes such an imperative possible, 
is the Principle of Rational Willing in its prescriptive form: “Since I want to pass the 
exam and I know that reading this book is an indispensably necessary means to pass the 
exam, I must read the book.”28 Based on this imperative, she makes maxims of her 
actions. Her principle would be “I shall read this book.”  
Recall that the power of choice has the function of executing the rules and orders 
legislated by the faculty of practical reason. In subsuming one’s power of choice to 
categorical imperatives, there might be an obstacle from within oneself, such as one’s 
own inclinations. Likewise, in compliance with hypothetical imperatives, there might 
also be some obstacles in the way of fulfilling the demand of the Principle of Rational 
Willing. One might think that here again the obstacle could be one’s own inclinations. 
                                                
28. Of course, she might be wrong in thinking that reading the book is an indispensably necessary 
means to pass the exam. But the point is not what really is necessary for passing the exam. Rather, it 
suffices that the agent considers a means as necessary for her to make an imperative.   
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However, the Principle of Rational Willing does not itself require that the agent resist 
those inclinations. Firstly because, in imposing the imperative upon herself, the agent 
decisively wills the end. In other words, because she decisively desires a particular end, 
she would resist any opposing inclinations. Second, even if those opposing inclinations 
are too strong to be given up, the agent might simply change her end and impose another 
practical necessity upon herself, now with a new hypothetical imperative in line with her 
inclinations. The Principle of Rational Willing does not preclude such a change in one’s 
ends. Hence, in compliance with hypothetical imperatives, the agent’s power of choice 
performs its executive function based on the particular demand of the imperative at a 
given time. 
Instead, an obstacle in the way of our compliance with the demands of 
hypothetical imperatives would be anything external that may prevent us from 
performing an action we deemed as necessary to achieve a given end. Imagine that a 
prisoner who is forced to break rocks has a headache she desires to relieve. She knows 
that an indispensably necessary means to relieve the headache is to take a nap. The 
Principle of Rational Willing in this case would be: “Since I want to relieve the headache, 
and I know that taking a nap is the indispensably necessary means to relieve the 
headache, I must take a nap.” Consequently, the hypothetical imperative she makes for 
herself would be “I ought to take a nap in order to relieve the headache.” Now she 
decides and makes the principle of her action as “I shall take a nap.” However, she is 
prevented from enacting these means by her situation of forced labor. That is, she cannot 
decide for herself, because a decision is already made for her that “she shall break rocks.” 
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This obstacle against the complying with the prescriptivity of the Principle of Rational 
Willing is not an internal obstacle, but is instead an external one. Therefore, in order to 
comply with the demands of hypothetical imperatives, one’s power of choice should 
make the principles of actions merely determined by one’s own reason, and thus 
“independent from being constrained by another’s choice.”  
This latter definition is freedom in the external use of choice as defined by Kant 
in the Doctrine of Right.29 Freedom as the independence of one’s choice from another’s 
choice, in this account, is a rational demand of our compliance with hypothetical 
imperatives we make for ourselves. The idea is that an agent should be free—from 
constraint by other and external beings—to decide which actions are necessary to pursue 
her ends. The necessity of this “should” lies in the prescriptivity of the Principle of 
Rational Willing, which in its own turn explains the possibility and the practical necessity 
of hypothetical imperatives. These imperatives are the rules given by one’s reason to 
pursue the ends one makes for oneself. Without having freedom in the external use of our 
choice, we neither can satisfy the prescriptivity of the Principle of Rational Willing, nor 
can we comply with the hypothetical imperatives we make for ourselves. In other words, 
without being externally free, hypothetical imperatives would not be practically 
                                                
29. One should notice that unlike some commentators, I do not define external freedom as the 
independence of an agent’s ability to set ends and pursue them. According to my reading, deciding what 
actions one wants to perform is conceptually different from setting ends. The latter is conceptually prior to 
the former, and cannot be externally limited. Hence, the proper definition of external freedom is the 
independence of my capacity to choose actions to achieve my ends from the same capacity in others. I will 
return to this point in the next chapter. Cf. n. 33.  
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necessary.30 We thus should be able to decide for our actions independently from the 
power of choice of other human beings.  
To explain more, assume that there is not such a prescription that I should be 
externally free. In this case, an agent accepts that anyone can decide for her what to do 
and what not to do. Now, since I am still free to set ends for myself, I will different ends 
based on my own desires. The Principle of Rational Willing demands that I make a 
hypothetical imperative for myself. The role of the hypothetical imperative I make is 
precisely to decide what actions I must do to achieve my end. But in the absence of 
external freedom (freedom in the external use of choice), I accept that my actions can be 
decided by anyone at any time. I have set ends for myself, and I have put myself under 
the necessity of the relevant hypothetical imperative, and I know what actions I must do 
to achieve my end; yet at the same time I have accepted that I am under the control of 
others to decide for me what actions I must do. The irrationality of this acceptance is that 
on the one hand I have put myself under the decisions of others, yet on the other hand, I 
have put myself under the practical necessity of the hypothetical imperatives I experience 
as the necessities of reason. This uncomfortable inconsistency makes it necessary to 
assume that I should be externally free from another’s choice in order to adhere to the 
demands of the imperatives of reason.  
                                                
30. A crucial point should be noted here to prevent misunderstanding. Here by relating external 
freedom to hypothetical imperatives, I am not suggesting that the duties of right, or juridical laws, are 
hypothetical imperatives. This is another topic of discussion. Here I emphasised on this straightforward 
observation that the ends we set for ourselves to pursue are of hypothetical kind. Indeed, this is in line with 
a benefit of Kant’s legal doctrine, that the rightfulness of actions, and thus their being in accordance with 
the freedom of everyone, is not dependent on the moral requirement of being internally free.  
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Here, I have shown that we can derive external freedom (freedom in the external 
use of choice) as a demand of Kant’s account of free agency. The freedom of will here is 
understood as a broad concept that explains Kantian account of “the causality of reason” 
as distinct from “the causality of nature.” The freedom of will affirms that practical 
reason gives rules and imperatives of any kind free from the determinations of natural 
laws. This is the consequence of Kant’s resolution to the Third Antinomy. Yet, to comply 
with the rules given by reason, freedom in the external use of choice is required to satisfy 
the prescriptivity of the Principle of Rational Willing. Thus understood, “the laws of 
freedom” are equivalent with the laws of causality of reason under the freedom of will, 
freely producing hypothetical imperatives. Thus, freedom in the external use of choice is 
a demand of compliance with hypothetical imperatives.   
Conclusion  
The concept of external freedom, as independence from being constrained by 
another’s choice, is the most fundamental concept in Kant’s theory of right. In this 
chapter, I have argued for a derivation of the concept of external freedom. External 
freedom can be derived from a Kantian rational, free agency. My claim was that external 
freedom from another’s choice is a demand of rationally complying with hypothetical 
imperatives given by one’s own reason. And based on Kant’s explanation of the practical 
necessity of hypothetical imperatives, human beings decide which actions they want to 
perform to achieve their ends free from any constraints imposed by other human beings. 
The prescriptivity of the Principle of Rational Willing leads to this prescriptive concept 
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of external freedom. Therefore, everyone has the same claim to be externally free from 
others, because it is a demand that is essential to the possibility of rational, free agency.  
I argued that external freedom is a demand of the rationality governing our 
compliance with the imperatives we issue for ourselves to achieve our desires and ends. 
This is a demand because there could always be an external obstacle in the way of our 
complying with those necessary imperatives—such as, in particular, the powers of choice 
of other human beings. In other words, our condition as living alongside others, taken 
with the necessity to comply with our own rules and projects—if we are to be deemed as 
rational beings—leads us to the requirement of being free from constraint by the wills of 
other human beings. We now understand the concept of external freedom as a normative 
concept by which we can regulate our external relations with each other. The principles 
that serve as this regulation of our external freedom is what Kant explores in his theory of 
right, to which I now turn.  
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Chapter Two 
Entering a Civil Condition: A Demand of External Freedom 
Introduction 
Human beings cannot avoid living with each other. This might be the most 
straightforward experience we have regarding our natural condition of our life. We 
interact with each other and unavoidably have influence on other human beings. Yet our 
rationality requires that we live with each other in a way that we can be externally free 
from the choices of other human beings. Kant’s theory of right, and within it, his 
labyrinthine argument for the necessity of a civil condition, aims at establishing the way 
in which human beings can live together without invalidating the rights of others to their 
own external freedom. Kant’s ultimate contention regarding such a condition of living 
together is that “when you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you ought to 
leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition” (MM 
6:307/451). He further adds that this condition of individuals in relation to one another is 
called a civil condition (MM 6:311/455).   
From this concise assertion about the necessity of a civil condition, we can see 
that this kind of condition must be established among human beings. The purpose of this 
chapter is to break down this assertion and analyze Kant’s argument for such a necessity. 
I begin by showing that external freedom (freedom in the external use of choice) is the 
concept around which Kant builds his theory of right. Thus, in the first section, I argue 
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for a twofold role for external freedom in Kant’s theory of right. My claim is that Kant 
establishes the rightfulness of the actions of human beings living together based on the 
concept of external freedom. In other words, freedom in the external use of choice is 
conceptually prior to the concept of right. The concept of right also justifies the 
coerciveness of juridical obligation, that is, the distinctive characteristic of the duties of 
right that they can be coercively imposed upon human beings. This second role can serve 
as an explanation of Kant’s distinction between the duties of right and the duties of virtue 
in the Metaphysics of Morals, a distinction which is crucial to Kant’s understanding of 
the nature of juridical obligation. Having defined the rightfulness of actions through the 
concept of freedom, Kant proceeds to show that to be externally free, human beings must 
be able to possess external objects. Thus, in the second section, I argue that rightful 
possession, by which we can forcibly exclude others from using the objects belonging to 
us, is a demand of external freedom. Kant’s argument for the necessity of a civil 
condition will be discussed in the third section, in which I argue that even though rightful 
possession is a necessary condition for our having external freedom, it is not a sufficient 
condition. Kant interestingly argues that without a civil condition, the very concept of 
rightful possession would amount to an infringement upon external freedom. Thus, in the 
third section, I argue that rightful possession without a civil condition would infringe 
upon—rather than confirm—our external freedom. With this, the main line of my 
argument comes to the conclusion that a civil condition is necessary because we are 
rational, free agents.   
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External Freedom: Rightfulness and Coerciveness 
The pivotal concept of Kant’s political philosophy is the concept of right. If a 
political authority is to be understood as regulating the relations between human beings 
with each other, it is the concept of right that, for Kant, lays the foundation for explaining 
these relations and for justifying political authority, as well as for explaining the basis for 
rightful relations between separate states.31 This regulative function of right is clear in 
Kant’s assertion that a system of rights [Das Recht]32 determines the conditions under 
which the choices of different individuals can be enacted in harmony with each other, or 
in other words without contradicting the enactment of the choices of others (MM 
6:230/387). Kant understands this concept of right as an a priori rational concept that 
cannot be defined by an empirical investigation of what it means in different juridical 
systems (MM 6:230/387). Kant seeks an explanation of the concept that can distinguish 
what right is universally, no matter the specific juridical system in which we use the 
concept.  
                                                
31. These are the subject-matters of the chapters of the Doctrine of Right, respectively Private 
Right, the Right of a State, the Right of Nations, and Cosmopolitan Right. To establish the necessity of a 
civil condition according to Kant, it suffices to focus on Private Right. 
32. In reading Kant’s Doctrine of Right, we should bear in mind that the word “right” can have 
three meanings that are not compatible with the meanings of the German word “Recht.” The first meaning 
of “right” (in Kant’s use “recht” and “gerecht”) is an adjective to describe actions and their conformity with 
laws. The second meaning as a noun (In German “Recht”) is in terms such as “a right to something.” The 
third meaning, which makes troubles for translators, is a noun referring to “a system of external laws.” This 
latter meaning is captured by the same German word “Das Recht.” In English, translators use different 
word. “Law,” “Right” (with a capital R), or simply “right” are among the suggestions. Here I used “system 
of rights” and mentioned the German word to avoid confusions with the concept of right as an adjective 
describing what actions are right. For a discussion of this difficulty, see Gregor’s note on her translation in 
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor. The Cambridge Edition of the Works 
of Immanuel Kant, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 358-59. For Kant’s own clarification 
of different meanings of this term, cf. DMM 23:238.  
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External Freedom and the Rightfulness of Actions 
The regulative function of the concept of right is captured by what Kant calls the 
Universal Principle of Right. In the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Right,” Kant gives 
his formulation of this Principle:  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance 
with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can 
coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law (MM 
6:230/387).  
This principle connects the concept of right with freedom in the external use of choice, as 
it is here that we see the rightfulness of an action revolves around the idea of freedom. 
Kant introduces freedom in the external use of choice in the articulation of what he calls 
our “innate right to freedom”:  
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), 
insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance 
with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by 
virtue of his humanity (MM 6:237/393).  
Thus, we see that while rightfulness refers to actions as they are enacted, the freedom of 
choice grounds the a priori rightfulness of those actions. Consequently, the concept of 
right regulates actions by referring to the freedom of choice, which we have defined as 
independence from being constrained by another’s choice.  
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The broad notion under which Kant defines the concept of choice is our faculty of 
desire, and by this he understands “a faculty to do or to refrain from doing as one 
pleases” (MM 6:213/374). What Kant considers to be distinctive about choice is that 
when we desire to do something, as far as we are “conscious of our ability to bring about 
the objects of our desire,” our desire can be called a choice. Understanding the objects of 
our desire as the ends we want to pursue, when we make a choice, we decide to perform 
an action to achieve an end that we desire. Choice is the capacity by which we determine 
those actions that are suitable to achieve an end. Freedom of choice, then, refers to our 
innate capacity to independently choose an action for achieving our ends.33 
Consequently, the right to freedom is a person’s right to act so as to achieve ends 
independently from the enactment of the same capacity by others.34  
A crucial characteristic of this conception of freedom should be stressed here. 
Ascribing rightfulness to actions but freedom to choice means that while actions can be 
described as right or wrong, it is choice that can be free or not free. This means that in the 
Kantian conception of freedom, even if I act freely—or in other words without being 
interfered by others—I still might have been forced to act. For example, imagine a forced 
                                                
33. In the literature, external freedom of choice is sometimes interpreted as the freedom to set and 
pursue ends without being constrained by the choices of others. For examples of reading external freedom 
as being able to set ends and pursue them independently, cf. Louis-Philippe Hodgson, “Kant on Property 
Rights and the State,” in Kantian Review 15, no. 1 (2010): 57, and Ripstein, Force and Freedom, Ch. 2. 
Hereafter, whenever I use the word decide, I mean to choose an action, not to set an end. 
34. We should keep in mind that Kant’s theory of right and freedom is not a theory of human 
decision-making. He does not aim to explain why and how people end up having conflicting choices. 
Neither does he claim that in setting ends for ourselves, we should not consider other’s dependence on our 
choices. The Universal Principle of Right merely aims to give a criterion for the rightfulness of actions, 
should people make conflicting choices.   
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labour camp in which a prisoner is forced to break rocks. The prisoner can freely break 
rocks without interference from others, meaning that others are not limiting her action. 
But to break rocks is not her choice, as she has been forced to perform this action. In this 
sense, her action is not performed independently from others, as the decision is made by 
another person.35 
From this emphasis on the importance of choice for his notion of freedom, Kant 
proceeds to exclude other alternatives to the notion of choice—such as wishes or needs—
from his theory of right. To see how wishes are excluded, recall that what Kant considers 
distinctive about choice is that when we desire to do something, as far as we are 
conscious of our ability to bring about the objects of our desire, our desire can be called 
choice. This means that when we choose, we decide to perform an action to achieve our 
ends. However, if there is no such consciousness, the desire is merely a wish (MM 
6:230/387). The difference thus lies in the “consciousness of our ability to bring about the 
ends.” How we ought to read this qualification is important to grasp the difference 
between choice and wish. Intuitively, choosing to have a house is different from wishing 
to have a house. In the former case, I already set for myself the end of having a house and 
I choose my actions so as to achieve that end. In the latter case, there is no such acting to 
achieve the end. “Consciousness” here should be read as a condition Kant adds to 
emphasize that the difference lies in an agent’s own mental attitude to the possibility of 
                                                
35. The importance to distinguish between the independence and the lack of interference is 
emphasised in Hodgson, “Kant on the Right to Freedom: A Defense,” Ethics 120, (2010): 806-807. He 
compares this understanding of freedom with a Hobbesian and Rousseauian conception of freedom. For 
more elaboration of the concept in comparison to contemporary liberal understandings of freedom, cf. 
Ripstein, Force and Freeedom, 31-42.  
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bringing about the end she has set for herself. In other words, Kant here intends to make 
the difference between choice and wish by referring to the agent’s own subjective attitude 
towards the end, rather than the possibility of the end’s achievement according to the 
conditions of the outside world.36  
Having established the difference between choice and wish, Kant excludes the 
latter from his theory of right. This means that with regard to conflicts in the enactment 
of freedom by individual human beings, as long as it is possible for individuals to interact 
with each other, there can be conflicts between one individual’s choice and another’s 
wish, without any implications for the rightfulness of the situation. I make a choice to buy 
a house, while someone else wishes to have the same house. This kind of conflict, 
according to Kant’s exposition of the concept of right, cannot be captured within a legal 
conceptual framework. To use Weinrib’s phrase, whereas choice has the power to 
influence the external world, wishing on its own has no “external effect.”37 Just as in the 
case of wishing, the individual’s “needs” are not included in the concept of right. Even if 
                                                
36. Ripstein provides a different interpretation of this distinction. He does not interpret the 
difference as merely based on an agent’s own attitude. Rather, he refers to the availability of “means” as 
marking the difference between choice and wish. He asserts that in choosing to do something, “having 
means with which to pursue purposes is conceptually prior to setting those purposes” (Force and Freedom, 
14). However, reading Kant here as referring to the agent’s own attitude rules out the actual means 
available to her. In other words, even if I do not have means available to achieve an end, if I have genuinely 
chosen to achieve them, I thereby must attempt to make the means available. This is indeed what we mean 
when we say that I act to achieve my end. Moreover, even if I have means available, it is still possible that I 
merely wish to achieve an end, for any other probable reason I might have not to choose an action, based on 
my own attitude towards actualizing my ends.   
37. Ernest J. Weinrib, “Law as Idea of Reason,” in Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. 
Howard Williams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 25. 
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I am in urgent need of a house, my need cannot be settled in terms of rights until that 
need is actualized in the form of a choice to buy one.38 
This emphasis on the external effects of individual choices on each other brings 
us to Kant’s understanding of the possibility of human interaction. Kant’s conception of 
right presupposes that individual human beings are capable of coming together and 
forming a community. If there was only one human being in the world, it would be 
absurd to talk about any concept of right, because in that case there would be no other’s 
choice that could be in conflict with those of the solitary individual, nor could her 
freedom be restricted by choices that are outside her own freedom of choice. Indeed, it 
would not make sense to talk about her external freedom, because in the very definition 
of external freedom, there lies being constrained by another’s choice, the independence 
from which constitutes the individual’s external freedom. Kant asserts that the concept of 
right has to do “only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to 
another,” and clarifies this by asserting that freedom concerns the actions of individuals 
only insofar as they have direct or indirect influence on those of others (MM 6:230/387).  
Let us now recapitulate the main points. We have the capacity to choose actions 
to achieve our ends. Since we live in community and interact with each other, it is 
possible that one’s capacity to choose actions to achieve ends can be restricted by those 
of others. The innate right to freedom asserts that it is my right to choose actions to 
                                                
38. Of course, taking others’ needs into account can be a moral demand. Likewise, if the social 
organization of a community is to be just, it needs to consider people’s needs. But the point here is not that 
Kant requires us to ignore others’ needs in our moral or economic considerations. Rather, he intends to 
scrutinize the fundamental concepts of right as such without any reference to other disciplines.  
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achieve my ends independently from others. Finally, the Universal Principle of Right says 
that the actions of others are right if they can satisfy the freedom (independence) of my 
capacity to choose actions to achieve our ends. We thus see that “rightful” actions are 
those which are in harmony with the freedom of choice of others, or in other words, 
insofar as they do not violate one’s independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice.  
We can begin to see how important the concept of freedom is for Kant’s 
articulation of the concept of right. Indeed, without freedom in this sense, Kant would not 
be able to formulate the Universal Principle of Right, since establishing the rightfulness 
of actions presupposes freedom in the external use of choice as its criterion. In this sense, 
the concept of freedom is conceptually prior to the concept of right.  
Kant is not explicit about the dependence of the Universal Principle of Right on 
the concept of freedom. Some commentators interpret the Universal Principle of Right as 
conceptually prior to the concept of freedom. For example, Gregor avers that the 
Universal Principle of Right defines the concept of freedom, while Ripstein recommends 
that the innate right to freedom is the “individualization” of the Principle, “applied to the 
case in which only persons are considered.”39 In both cases, the Principle is taken to be 
conceptually prior to freedom. 
One motivating factor for such interpretations is Kant’s own assertion that the 
Principle as a “postulate that is incapable of further proof” (MM 6:231/388). However, 
                                                
39. Cf. Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 49 and Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 35. 
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strictly speaking, Kant does not describe the Principle itself as a postulate. After 
explaining the Principle, he proceeds to provide an imperative form of the Principle, now 
called “the universal law of right,” which says “so act externally that the free use of your 
choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” 
(MM 6:231/388). While the Universal Principle of Right provides a criterion of the 
rightfulness of actions, this latter imperative form “lays an obligation” on us. Kant 
immediately notes that the nature of this obligation is not that “I myself should limit my 
freedom” according to this Principle. Rather, he continues, “reason says only that 
freedom is limited to those conditions in conformity with the idea of it and that it may 
also be actively limited by others” (MM 6:231/388). It is only this latter assertion that 
Kant describes as a postulate that is incapable of further proof. I will turn to this 
obligatory function of the Universal Principle of Right in a moment, but my point here is 
that strictly speaking, Kant does not describe the Principle itself as a postulate. Therefore, 
we can plausibly read freedom as being conceptually prior to the Universal Principle of 
Right. In short, the Universal Principle of Right defines a criterion for the rightfulness of 
actions by demarcating how those actions are to be consistent with the freedom of all 
human beings.  
However, the role of freedom in Kant’s theory of right is not limited to its being a 
criterion for the rightfulness of actions. To see the second significant role of the concept 
of freedom for Kant’s doctrine of right, we need to investigate the obligatory function of 
the Universal Principle of Right that I have mentioned above. Kant’s claim, I argue, is 
that the concept of right is coercive for no reason other than the very nature of the 
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concept of freedom. To explain this significant role, we need to read the obligatory 
function of the Universal Principle of Right in the broader context of Kant’s division 
between duties of right and duties of virtue. 
External Freedom and Coerciveness 
Kant’s emphasis on the obligatory function of the Universal Principle of Right 
means that we have duty to act in a way that satisfies the demands of the Principle, or in 
other words by acting in a way that does not contradict the freedom of others. Kant 
clarifies the relation between duty [Pflicht] and obligation [Verbindung] in the 
Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, when he says “Duty [Pflicht] is that action to 
which someone is obligated [Verbunden].40 It is therefore the matter of obligation” (MM 
6:222/377). This means that every right has a corresponding duty: if I have a right to 
choose actions to achieve my ends independently from others, then others have a duty to 
refrain from infringing upon my freedom. Kant explains the distinctive nature of the 
duties of right when he asserts that the Principle 
lays an obligation on me, but it does not at all expect, far less demand, that 
I myself should limit my freedom to those conditions just for the sake of 
this obligation… when one’s aim is not to teach virtue but only to set forth 
what is right, one may not and should not represent that law of right as 
itself the incentive to action (MM 6:231/388). 
                                                
40. Gregor’s translation for Verbunden is “bound” which misses the connection with Verbindung 
or obligation. I have slightly modified the translation by suggesting the word “obligated.”  
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Kant’s concern here is to emphasize the obligatory function of the Principle and at the 
same time to avoid the conflation of right and virtue. There are duties of right but as 
distinct from duties of virtue.  
Kant proposes a criterion for distinguishing between the two types of duties in the 
“Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals.” The duties of right are those into which the 
individual can be coerced, whereas the duties of virtue are those into which the individual 
cannot be coerced (MM 6:220/384). In other words, external lawgiving in the domain of 
rights is possible, whereas the kind of lawgiving that is at work in ethics is internal. The 
difference, Kant clarifies, lies in the different kinds of obligation we have towards laws. 
Ethical obligation is that by which the “incentive” to obey the law is the idea of the law 
itself. In contrast, juridical obligation is that which is indifferent to the incentives for the 
agent who obeys a law. My obedience to juridical law because of the external constraint 
means that it falls within the domain of right. In this domain, it does not matter what 
constitutes my incentives to obey laws. If I obey a moral law out of my fear from an 
external lawgiver, my obedience to that law is not ethical. However, since ethical 
obligation means obeying a law by making it my end, and since, as we saw, it is not 
possible for another person to set my end for me, it is not possible for another person to 
coerce me into fulfilling an ethical obligation (MM 6:381/514). Although it is possible 
that I ethically obey a duty of right by making it my own end, juridically obeying a duty 
of right does not require that I obey it for the sake of law by setting the fulfillment of that 
law as my end. Therefore, one can be coerced into the duties belonging to the domain of 
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right by an external source.41 In other words, coercion from an external source suffices to 
obey a duty of right, even if the agent herself does not make the duty her own law. Thus, 
we see that juridical obligation and ethical obligation are different in that the former, 
unlike the latter, may be coerced. Moreover, the obligation connected with the Universal 
Principle of Right is a juridical one, meaning that it is accompanied by coercion. 
This coercive character for the Universal Principle of Right can be seen as a 
demand of freedom when we turn to Kant’s argument for the justification of coercion in 
the domain of rights. Kant provides an argument for the contention that “right is 
connected with an authorization to use coercion.” The argument, the crux of which I 
argue is reason’s emphasis on the necessity of ensuring freedom, goes as follows. 
According to the Universal Principle of Right, any action is right if it can coexist with the 
freedom of everyone. Thus, any action that is not right in this sense is merely a hindrance 
to freedom, since based on the Principle, a wrong action is that which wholly violates a 
person’s freedom. Now, Kant asserts that based on the principle of non-contradiction, a 
hindering of a hindrance to freedom is consistent with freedom, and thus must be right. 
Hindering of a hindrance to freedom is exactly what Kant understands by coercion. In 
other words, if a person, through freedom in her external use of choice, infringes upon 
my freedom, her own freedom can be justifiably restricted, since a hindering of a 
hindrance to freedom is itself in harmony with the concept of right. We all have a duty to 
                                                
41. Kant here can be interpreted as having admitted that such a division is not exhaustive. It has 
also been argued that this division is not exclusive either. Cf. Onora O’Neill, “Enactable and Enforceable: 
Kant’s Criteria for Right and Virtue,” in Kant-Studien 107, no. 1 (2017): 111-124.   
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fulfil the demands of the right of the individual human being, and this can mean coercing 
others to adhere to the Universal Principle of Right in their actions and choices. In short, 
if my choice is in harmony with the freedom of others—that is, if it is right—every other 
human being can be justifiably coerced to fulfil her duty to accommodate my right action 
by limiting wrong actions. 
This argument reveals a noteworthy characteristic of Kant’s understanding of 
coercion. Both wrong actions and coercion are restrictions imposed upon a person’s 
freedom of choice. In both cases, the person is forced to refrain from freely choosing and 
doing something. But coercion differs from a wrong action in that coercion is a restriction 
to a person’s freedom of choice only if her enactment of her freedom of choice itself 
imposes a restriction on another’s freedom of choice. What makes coercion a rightful 
action, then, is the very nature of the concept of external freedom. If I have a right to 
choose actions to achieve my ends freely, but in doing so I violate the same right of 
another person to choose actions to achieve her ends freely, I can be justifiably coerced to 
refrain from doing so for the sake of the universality of the concept of external freedom. 
Therefore, the coerciveness of the duties of right is justified by referring to the concept of 
external freedom. And since coerciveness, as we saw, distinguishes the domain of rights 
from that of virtues, we can see how significant the concept of external freedom (freedom 
in the external use of choice) is for the domain of rights in general. 
In this section, I explained how the Universal Principle of Right serves as Kant’s 
suggestion for the rightfulness of actions, and I analyzed different aspects of the concept 
of right. I argued that the concept of freedom plays a twofold role in Kant’s theory of 
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right. First, the Universal Principle of Right presupposes the concept of freedom and 
suggests it as the criterion of the rightfulness of action. Second, freedom in the external 
use of choice is a concept that Kant uses to justify the coerciveness of the Universal 
Principle of Right, or the coerciveness of obligation that is operating in the domain of the 
duties of right, as opposed to ethical duties. In short, an agent’s action is right as far as it 
does not infringe upon the capacity of others to choose actions to achieve ends, and 
anyone can be coerced to refrain from such infringement. The next step Kant takes 
towards establishing the necessity of a civil condition is the contention that the innate 
right to freedom cannot be fulfilled without external rights to external objects. We now 
turn to the concept of possession and its role in Kant’s overall argument in the Doctrine 
of Right.   
Possession as a Demand of External Freedom 
We have seen that within the very concept of right, there lies the plausibility of 
coercion: everyone who has a right to do something also has the right to coerce others—
that is, to limit others’ freedom—so that she can secure her own right. However, this 
could lead us to a situation that appears to be fundamentally removed from security and 
stability making it more like the situation of war of all against all others. But the 
necessity of the civil condition, as Kant understands it, is not merely to ensure that we 
avoid this kind of insecurity. That is, the appeal to a civil condition has deeper roots in 
Kant’s account of possession. His main contention is that the civil condition is the only 
condition in which possession is possible. In fact, he begins his argument for the 
necessity of a civil condition with the concept of possession. The difficulty, thus, is to 
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show how possessing external objects—or having external rights—can be interpreted as 
necessary for the innate right to freedom. My main focus in this section is to argue for 
such a necessity by showing that rightful possession is necessary because without it we 
cannot be externally free.  
Neither the Universal Principle of Right—the principle that defines the 
rightfulness of actions as the conformity of actions with the freedom of everyone—nor 
the very concept of external freedom—as independence from being constrained by 
another’s choice—refer to “external objects” available for an agent to use. Thus, one 
might expect to see why a theory of right needs to discuss possessing of external objects. 
Indeed, Kant’s claim that the only innate right we have is freedom accompanies the claim 
that every other right we have to things belongs to the sphere of external or acquired 
rights. In other words, external freedom belongs to us by virtue of our humanity 
(understood as our personality independent of physical attributes), whereas every other 
thing that might belong to us is external and we have external right to them. This division 
between internal and external right, together with the fact that neither in the Universal 
Principle of Right, nor in the concept of external freedom, can we find an account of 
external objects that belong to us, leads us to the difficulty to explain the transition from 
external freedom to the acquired rights to external objects. And without such an 
explanation, it would not be clear why possession—and thus the civil condition—is a 
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demand of external freedom. The explanation of this transition can be found in Kant’s 
argument for what he calls the “Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to Rights.”42   
Kant starts his discussion of possession by defining what is rightfully mine as 
“that is rightfully mine (meum iuris) with which I am so connected that another’s use of it 
without my consent would wrong me” (MM 6:245/401 §1). In other words, another’s use 
of something that is rightfully mine would infringe upon my freedom. Kant proceeds to 
show why this rightful possession is necessary and how it is possible that an object can be 
rightfully connected to the person. The Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to 
Rights (§2) is provided to argue for this necessity.43  This Postulate says that 
It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine, that 
is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of choice 
                                                
42. There is a considerable debate regarding the correct place of the paragraphs containing the 
Postulate in the Metaphysics of Morals. Gregor’s translation, following Ludwig’s suggestion, changes the 
place of the Postulate from §2 to §6. The suggested correction has a crucial influence on how we are 
supposed to read the role of the Postulate in Kant’s argument. I will return to this point later, but for now, it 
should be noted that regarding the proper place of the Postulate, I am following Westphal in that the 
Postulate belongs to its published place in §2. Cf. Westphal, “A Kantian Justification of Possession,” 94. 
43. It should be noted that Kant’s discussion of possession should not be read as a defense of 
private ownership. Hodgson rightly emphasizes that the necessity of rightful possession should not be 
conflated with the form of private property found in capitalism. Rightful possession merely requires a 
rightful system in which the possessor can exclude others from using a certain external object. Cf. 
Hodgson, “Kant on Property Rights and the State,” 62. Westphal notably insists that properly speaking the 
concept of “property” is different from “possession” in that the former contains a complex package of 
rights, including the right to manage, income, and capital, that cannot be attributed to the concept of 
possession as a general concept that only requires the exclusion of others from using an object. My reading 
of the concept of possession, in its avoidance of the term “property,” is close to Westphal. For his 
discussion, cf. Westphal, “A Kantian Justification of Possession,” 90-91. For an example of a conflation 
between possession and private ownership, and thus giving an anti-communistic reading of Kant’s concept 
of possession, cf. Wolfgang Kersting, “Politics, Freedom, and Order: Kant’s Political Philosophy,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant, edited by Paul Guyer, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
348-349. 
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would in itself (objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius) is 
contrary to right (MM 6:246/404).44 
This Postulate contains Kant’s significant transition from the innate right to freedom to 
the rights to external objects. To see why Kant provides this contention as a Postulate, we 
need to see why the principles I have discussed so far cannot serve as a ground for the 
necessity of possessing external objects. Reviewing the Principle of Rational Willing, the 
Universal Principle of Right, and the innate right to freedom can help us with 
understanding the specific role of the Postulate in Kant’s theory of right, that is, the 
necessity of possession for freedom.  
We have seen that the Principle of Rational Willing—from which we can derive 
the concept of external freedom—asserts that rational willing of an end requires rational 
willing of the means, and that this requires the agent’s awareness of the indispensability 
of particular means to achieve particular ends. It is also undeniable that human beings 
require external objects to perform actions. Whatever ends we have in our minds, and 
whatever actions we deem as necessary to achieve those ends, we need external objects to 
perform our actions.45 Thus, the Principle of Rational Willing implies also that if we will 
an end, we also will that certain objects are indispensably necessary to achieve that end. 
                                                
44. Following Guyer and Westphal, I have replaced “contrary to right” with Gregor’s “contrary to 
rights.” The German term is rechtswidrig and as Guyer notes there is no reason to use a plural word in the 
translation. This is important because the phrase “contrary to right” reads as referring to the Universal 
Principle of Right. Cf. Guyer, “Kant’s Deduction of the Principles of Right,” 55, and Westphal, “A Kantian 
Justification of Possession,” 92.  
45. It might seem that, for example, a simple action such as taking a nap or talking do not require 
any external objects. However, even for these simple actions, there needs to be a piece of land on which we 
can rest or talk. Therefore, external objects are required for any kind of action.  
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Therefore, this Principle can explain why we require external objects: we cannot 
rationally will an end without willing the means. However, the rightfulness of the 
connection between an object and the possessor cannot be explained by the Principle of 
Rational Willing, since using objects is different from possessing them. As a concept 
belonging to the domain of rights, possession as we have seen, requires a restriction on 
everyone’s use of an object except for the possessor. Such a restriction cannot be 
explained by the Principle of Rational Willing. 
Neither can the Universal Principle of Right explain the necessity of rightful 
possession. We have seen that the Universal Principle of Right describes an action as 
right insofar as the action is consistent with everyone’s freedom. Obviously using an 
external object is itself an action: I cannot use an object unless while I am using it I am 
performing an action. Applying the Universal Principle of Right to the use of external 
objects would merely lead to the assertion that every use of an object is right if it can 
coexist with everyone’s freedom. The Principle is so general and formal that it cannot 
explain why it is necessary to possess an external object such that we can prohibit others 
from using it.  
Moreover, the innate right to freedom, as we have seen, asserts that we have the 
right to choose our actions independently from others. Simply put, others have the duty to 
refrain from deciding what actions I shall perform to achieve my ends. With regards to 
the use of external objects, the innate right to freedom confirms that I should be able to 
decide, independently from others, which objects I want to use to achieve my ends. The 
innate right to freedom does not contain any reference to the necessity of excluding 
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others from using an external object. Therefore, the question why it is necessary to 
possess an external object, so that we can prohibit others from using the possessed object 
remains unanswered.  
This is why Kant provides the necessity of rightful possession as a “Postulate,” 
hence indicating that such a necessity is not contained in the Universal Principle of Right, 
nor in the innate right to freedom. Nevertheless, Kant gives an argument for the Postulate 
that serves as the key to his understanding of possession as a right.46 
Kant provides us with some clarifications of the concepts contained in the 
Postulate. First, an “external object,” Kant defines, is an object distinct from an agent 
(MM 6:253/407). This means that even if an object is inseparably attached to my body, 
and thus is in the same space and time as I am, as far as I can distinguish it as distinct 
from myself, the object is “external” to me. Thus understood, to my own body—as 
something that is not distinct from myself—I do not have external right; rather, my right 
to my own body is an innate right. If one interferes with my use of my own body, one is 
violating my innate right to freedom. In other words, to establish my right to my own 
body, I do not need to establish that I possess my body and I have an external right to it. 
Any object except for my own body and as distinct from my body, is “external object” 
that I can possess and to which I can meaningfully say that I have an external right.  
Second, an “object of my choice” in the Postulate refers to anything that an agent 
has “the physical power to make use of” (MM 6:246/405). In other words, when I decide 
                                                
46. For an explanation of Kant’s use of the term “postulate” for some principles that still can be 
derived from other principles, cf., Guyer, “Kant’s Deduction of the Principles of Right,” 23-64.  
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to perform an action by my power of choice, my awareness that I have the physical 
power to use an object suffices for me to deem that object as an “object of my power of 
choice.”47 We should bear in mind that thus understood, merely because I have 
something within my power to use, I cannot claim that I possess it, nor that I am entitled 
to own it. The physical power to use something is different from possessing something.48  
The Postulate thus clarified is an assertion not about the necessity for human 
beings to use external objects—to have the objects within their physical power. Instead, it 
merely refers to the necessity of rightful possession of external objects, so that the 
possessor can prohibit others from using the possessed objects. The Postulate asserts that 
a community of people in which it is not possible to possess external objects is “contrary 
to right,” that is, is a violation of the Universal Principle of Right. Thus, it is necessary, as 
a matter of rights, to be able to possess external objects. 49  
Now, what is the most significant is to argue why it is necessary to possess 
external objects. Again, it is not because we need to use external objects to achieve our 
                                                
47. Also recall from the previous section that choice is different from wish in that in the former 
there is a consciousness of being able to perform actions to achieve ends, while in the latter there is not 
such consciousness. The point here about being aware of our physical power to use an object, I think, is 
another emphasis on the same point Kant already discussed about the difference between choice and wish. 
In the Drafts for the Metaphysics of Morals, where he discusses the Postulate, Kant asserts that having this 
physical power is “the sole condition under which something can be an object of power of choice (not of 
mere wish)” (DMM 23:212).  
48. Kant asserts that “in order to think of something simply as an object of my choice it is 
sufficient for me to be conscious of having it within my power” (MM 6:246/406). This is in line with my 
knowledge of indispensably necessary means as a rational condition of willing an end, as explained by the 
Principle of Rational Willing.  
49. In the Drafts for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant notes that “by nature no outer corporeal 
thing belongs to anyone at all, and thus all things are to this extent res nullius {ownerless things}. As a 
matter of right, however, no one can be necessitated to adopt a principle in accordance with which outer 
usable things as such would belong to no one” (DMM 23:287).  
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ends—this claim is contained in the Principle of Rational Willing. Kant’s claim is the 
stronger claim that without being able to possess external objects rightfully, we would 
end up violating the Universal Principle of Right.  
Kant’s complex argument goes as follows:  
An object of my choice is something that I have the physical power to use. 
If it were nevertheless absolutely not within my rightful power to make 
use of it, that is, if the use of it could not coexist with the freedom of 
everyone in accordance with a universal law (would be wrong), then 
freedom would be depriving itself of the use of its choice with regard to an 
object, by putting usable objects beyond any possibility of being used; in 
other words, it would annihilate them in a practical respect and make them 
into res nullius, even though in the use of things choice was formally 
consistent with everyone’s outer freedom in accordance with universal 
laws (MM 6:246/405).  
This dense paragraph shows that Kant’s argument for the necessity of rightful possession 
revolves around the concept of freedom. Kant emphasizes that if rightful possession is 
not possible, then freedom deprives itself from the use of objects by putting usable 
objects beyond the possibility of being used.50   
                                                
50. This dense argument, in the Drafts for the Metaphysics of Morals takes several pages with 
various explanations. The main point of the argument—that usable objects would not be usable and thus 
freedom excludes itself from using objects—can also be observed in 23:278. But in addition to this main 
claim, Kant argues also that the impossibility of rightful possession involves a contradiction (DMM 
23:230). In a circumstance in which objects cannot be rightfully possessed, the mere using of an object is 
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This claim might seem to be strange considering Kant’s explicit distinction 
between using an object and possessing it. While the Postulate is a claim about 
possession, the argument that Kant provides concerns the usable objects themselves. 
Therefore, the claim that possession is necessary because without it usable objects would 
not be usable does not explain why rightful possession is necessary for external freedom, 
nor why it may be that without rightful possession usable objects would be unusable.  
Let us imagine a circumstance in which it is not possible for anyone to possess 
any external object. Recall that what is distinctive about rightfully possessing an object is 
that the possessor can exclude others from using the possessed object. On the face of it, it 
might seem that in such a circumstance, people are more free to perform whatever actions 
they want. In the Drafts, Kant uses this point as an argument against the necessity of 
rightful possession and contends that the power of choice that is limited to the condition 
of mine or yours “would not be a free power of choice” (DMM 23:230). But Kant’s 
account of possession makes it such that it is in exactly this situation that external 
freedom is infringed. Moreover, the Postulate, as we saw, asserts that the absence of 
                                                                                                                                            
not an infringement upon anyone’s external freedom, and thus is right. However, since every external 
object is usable, and thus, everyone can rightfully use objects—without infringing upon anyone’s external 
freedom—everyone in using the objects are infringing upon anyone’s external freedom. In other words, 
using external objects in itself is right, because it is not an infringement upon the external freedom of 
others. Exactly because using external objects is rightful for everyone, everyone has the right to use 
external objects. If everyone has the right to use an object, then anyone who uses the object does wrong 
against anyone. It is self-contradictory to say that every use of an object is right and wrong. This argument 
is not inserted in the Metaphysics of Morals. However, the contention that the mere use of things is 
formally right is kept in the text when Kant asserts that “in the use of things choice was formally consistent 
with everyone’s outer freedom in accordance with universal laws.” It is also noticeable that Kant’s 
discussion of the Postulate in the Drafts takes the form of an antinomy, the thesis of which is the Postulate. 
However, in the Metaphysics of Morals, the presentation of the Postulate and its argument is not 
antinomial.   
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possession is contrary to right. This indicates that an action that denies the reality of 
possession is not rightful, or alternatively is an infringement upon the freedom of others. 
Thus, we need to see how a circumstance in which no external object can be rightfully 
possessed is an infringement upon freedom.  
Let us call the circumstance in which external objects “have to belong to no one,” 
that is, external objects are ownerless, the circumstance of res nullius. In such a 
circumstance, no one can claim that an external object is one’s own. This means that no 
one can rightfully prevent anyone from using an object. Even during the time in which I 
am using an object, I cannot claim that the object is mine. Using Kant’s own example, 
when I am using an apple, if a person grabs it from my hand, she is not violating my 
external right—because there is no mine or yours in a circumstance of res nullius (MM 
6:250/404). Rather, she is restricting my innate right to freedom. This is important 
because as soon as she grabs it from my hand and starts using it, I cannot claim that she 
should give it back to me, because now the apple is in her use, and if I grab it from her 
hand, I now restrict her innate right to freedom. This means that I cannot rightfully 
exclude others from the use of any external object.51  
In a circumstance of res nullius no one can exclude others from using an object. 
In such a circumstance, the maxim that everyone may make would be that “I shall use 
any external object that I want to use.” Let us examine the circumstance from the 
                                                
51. I am insisting on the rightful exclusion of others, because it is obvious that I can exclude 
others from using an object by force. I can simply resist a person who tries to grab the apple from my 
hands.  
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standpoint of an agent. An agent who has set an end for herself, in order to comply with 
the corresponding hypothetical imperative that she has given to herself as practically 
necessary to achieve her end, she must be able to decide what actions she shall perform 
independently from another’s power of choice.52 Furthermore, we have seen that 
performing actions requires using external objects. This means that when she decides 
what actions she wants to perform, she is already aware that she can use some external 
objects. Now in the circumstance of res nullius, the agent is aware that everyone else has 
the maxim to use any external objects they want, including the specific object she deems 
as necessary for performing her action. This means that she is aware that she cannot 
rightfully exclude others from using the object she deems as necessary. In this case, in 
order to decide what action she wants to perform, and what object she shall use, she 
needs to look at the actual availability of the object and see if the object is left unused by 
others. Without being sure that she can exclude others from using an object, she cannot 
decide what action she shall perform. This dependency of the agent’s decision on the 
availability of the object is equivalent with the dependency of her decision on others’ 
decisions. She is not sure if others are going to use the object she deems necessary for her 
action, nor is she sure if others are going to use the object while she is using it. She is not 
even sure that, when for any reason she wants to suspend her use of the object 
temporarily, others will not start using it. Taking this latter case into account, even 
deciding to stop an action would be dependent on the decisions of others. Therefore, 
                                                
52. As I have shown in the first chapter, this concept of external freedom is a demand of the 
prescriptivity of the Principle of Rational Willing. 
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without a guarantee of possession, the agent cannot freely decide about her actions and 
her use of objects, nor can she freely decide to stop her action. That everyone is right to 
use any external object leads to a circumstance in which even deciding what action an 
agent wants to perform would be principally dependent on the decisions of others. Thus, 
in the circumstance of res nullius, external objects that are usable—within our physical 
power to use—would be unusable, because performing actions, or alternatively using 
objects, would be fundamentally dependent on another’s power of choice. And this 
dependency is prohibited by the concept of external freedom.  
To return to the example of the agent reading a book, in order to make the choice 
that “she shall read the book,” she must be aware that she can exclude others from using 
the book in lieu of her own use of it.53 But in the circumstance of res nullius, she knows 
that she cannot exclude others in that way. Therefore, she cannot decide to perform her 
action without being dependent on the decisions of others. Thus, external freedom 
(freedom in the external use of choice) requires that there should be a system of rightful 
possession, in which there is a boundary between what is mine and what is yours, so that 
before deciding an action, I can be assured that I can exclude others from using the object 
that I want to use.54 In other words, while external objects are supposedly within my 
                                                
53. Again, it should be noted that Kant’s account of possession is not about private property. The 
agent does not need to own the book in the sense that private ownership requires. Even borrowing a book 
from someone else requires that she can exclude others from the use of the borrowed book.  
54. Recall that what distinguishes choosing from mere wishing, according to Kant, was that in 
choosing to act, I am aware that I am able to perform my action. This awareness requires that I should be 
aware that I can exclude others from using the object through which I shall perform my action. In other 
words, without such awareness, my decision to act would be a mere wish. Cf. n. 47.  
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power to use, without being able to exclude others from the use of them, I cannot use the 
objects and thus the circumstance of res nullius makes the usable objects unusable.  
One might object that even in a system of rightful possession, where there is the 
rightful entitlement to exclude others from the use of certain objects, the decision of an 
agent is still dependent on the availability of external objects and thus on the decisions of 
others. Indeed, when there is a system of rightful possession, I would be rightfully 
prohibited from using some objects, and thus my decision would be dependent on 
whether or not an object is possessed by someone else. But the point of the argument is 
that in the circumstance of res nullius, every power of choice, and every decision would 
be fundamentally dependent on the decision of others. In that case, external freedom is 
principally violated. Thus, we need to have a system of rightful possession, even though 
it would be a limitation of freedom, a limitation that is necessary for the very concept of 
freedom. Thus, Kant’s contention is that since human beings will to use external things, it 
is necessary to act in conformity to conditions of right, that is, to extend the rightfulness 
of actions to using external objects. Hence the need for such a Postulate “lies in human 
nature simply as rational beings” (DMM 23:226).  
The Postulate has shown that an action based on the maxim that external objects 
have to belong to no one is wrong because it infringes upon our freedom. That is, it must 
be possible for human beings to have rights to external objects. We already know that if I 
have a right to something, others have a duty to act in a way that is consistent with my 
freedom. This obligation is related to the Universal Principle of Right as a principle that 
lays an obligation upon us. Hence, regarding the right to external objects, Kant also 
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provides a prescriptive form of the Postulate when he says that “it is a duty of right to act 
towards others so that which is external (usable) could also become someone’s” (MM 
6:252/406). This means that rightful possession accompanies an obligation on everyone 
to refrain from using certain objects that are possessed by someone.55  
Kant avers that rightful possession is possible only if we assume an intelligible 
meaning for possession: in order to be able to say that “it is possible for any object of my 
choice to be reckoned as rightfully mine,” we need to extend the concept of possession 
beyond empirical possession (MM 6:252/406). While this empirical/intelligible 
distinction reminds us of Kant’s famous distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason 
between phenomenon and noumenon, the distinction here is less contentious: the basic 
difference between them is whether or not there is a physical connection between the 
possessor and the object. Empirical possession is holding an object, but intelligible 
possession includes possessing an object without holding it (MM 6:246/401). This means 
that if I want to claim meaningfully that I possess an external object, there must be 
                                                
55. Regarding the obligation accompanied with the Postulate, it should be noted that after the 
argument for the Postulate, Kant refers to it as a permissive law that “gives us an authorization that could 
not be got from mere concepts of right as such, namely to put all others under an obligation, which they 
would not otherwise have, to refrain from using certain objects of our choice because we have been the first 
to take them into our possession” (MM 6:247/406). I have not relied on this assertion in my reading of the 
Postulate, mainly because the obligation to which it refers is about the first acquisition of external objects. 
For my current purpose to establish the necessity of rightful possession, the problem of the first acquisition 
is not of significant relevance. Moreover, the obligatory role of the Postulate, as I have explained, relates to 
its being a duty of right. In other words, the very argument for the rightful possession implies that, as a 
matter of right, others must be excluded from using an object—they are rightfully obligated to refrain from 
using a certain object. Consequently, the obligatory role of the Postulate does need a further justification.  
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another meaning of possession: intelligible possession that is a possession abstract from 
the empirical conditions of physical possession.56  
If possession merely means physical possession, then we can possess something 
only as far as we have a physical connection with it. This contention stands opposed to 
the Postulate of Practical Reason established above. Recall that it must be possible for an 
external object to belong to someone. If there is no intelligible concept of possession, that 
is, if I cannot possess something even though I am not holding it, the only condition to 
possess an external object would be to be physically connected with it. This would lead 
us back to the circumstance of res nullius. Imagine a system of rightful possession in 
which the condition to possess something rightfully, and thus the condition to rightfully 
exclude others from using an object, is that the possessor should be in physical 
connection with the possessed object. In this case, the claim would be that it is possible to 
own external objects, and others are obligated to refrain from using my object, but if and 
only if I am holding the object or I have a physical connection with it. However, as soon 
as I leave the object untouched, I have lost the condition of rightfully possessing it, and 
                                                
56. As I mentioned earlier, it is important how to read the proper place of the Postulate in the text. 
I noted that, following Westphal, I have been interpreting the Postulate as belonging to its published order 
in §2. If we read the Postulate as belonging to §6, then Kant’s discussion of intelligible possession as 
distinct from physical possession would be prior to the Postulate. Thus, the main claim of the Postulate 
would be interpreted as establishing the necessity of intelligible possession, rather than the more general 
concept of rightful possession. However, if we read the Postulate as belonging to §2, then the concept of 
intelligible possession can be read as a necessary condition for the possibility of rightful possession. As I 
noted earlier, I have been following this latter interpretation, by reading the Postulate as belonging to §2. 
Kant’s own reference in §7 to the Postulate as belonging to §2 is also noticeable. Westphal notably 
emphasizes on the abstractness and generality of the Postulate, in which there is no reference to the concept 
of intelligible possession. For Westphal’s discussion of this issue, cf. Westphal, “A Kantian Justification of 
Possession,” 93-94. For examples of accepting the suggested correction, cf. Flikshcuh, Kant and Modern 
Political Philosophy, 114-116, and Hodgson, “Kant on Property Rights and the State.” 
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thus I am not entitled to prevent others from using it. This is indeed the circumstance of 
res nullius, because again my decision to perform an action and use an object would be 
dependent on the decisions of others. This explains why Kant asserts that the real 
definition of what is externally mine is to be articulated as “something external is mine if 
I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession 
of it (not holding the object)” (MM 6:249/403). We thus see that in the very definition of 
the concept of an external object as possibly mine, there lies the possibility of possessing 
it in a way that does not require only empirical possession. Otherwise, external objects 
cannot belong to anyone, which is in opposition to the Postulate of Practical Reason.57  
We have seen so far that having external rights is necessary for our innate right to 
freedom, and that the Postulate that contains that necessity imposes an obligation upon 
everyone to refrain from using a possessed object. It is a duty of right for us to refrain 
from using an object that is possessed by a person, and that person can use coercion to 
exclude us from using what belongs to her.  
                                                
57. For a different argument for the necessity of rightful possession for external freedom, cf., 
Hodgson, “Kant on Property Rights and the State,” 60-62. Following the suggested correction, he reads the 
Postulate as an argument against a system of merely physical possession. Then, to demonstrate that 
physical possession is an unjustified restriction on external freedom, he argues that a system of mere 
physical possession “makes my (eminently restricted) ability to occupy space and to hold objects the 
measure of my ability to make objects into my means, and thus to set and pursue ends for myself.” The 
main point of his argument is that in a system of physical possession, my external freedom would be 
undermined because I am restricted to some natural limitations. However, my argument above is focused 
on the dependency of our choices on others in such a system of physical possession. It is true that in a 
system of mere physical possession, I would be limited to act in a way I please. But the limitation, strictly 
speaking, is more on the possible scope of decisions that I can make for myself than on my external 
freedom itself. To show that my external freedom would be infringed on a physical system of possession, 
we should argue that in such a system, our power of choice would be dependent on that of others. Only in 
this way can we show that external freedom—as independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice—would be undermined.  
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Having established the necessity of such a rightful exclusion of others from using 
objects belonging to us, Kant proceeds to point to a further requirement without which 
the rightful possession of external objects would be a further infringement upon freedom. 
This requirement is the existence of a civil condition, the necessity of which we can only 
now turn to.  
The Civil Condition as a Demand of External Freedom 
The necessity of a civil condition is captured in Kant’s claim that all human 
beings who could come into relations of rights with one another ought to enter a civil 
condition (MM 6:306/451). I have shown so far that by virtue of the fact that we are 
rational beings, we must be able to decide our actions independently from the decisions 
of others. To satisfy the fulfilment of our right to be externally free, we should think of 
possessing external objects as necessary. Rightful possession is necessary if we want to 
avoid any infringements upon our freedom. From this point, Kant interestingly proceeds 
to argue for the necessity of a civil condition. Succinctly, the claim I argue for in this 
section is that the civil condition is necessary because without it our freedom would be 
infringed. Through this argument, it will be clear that although rightful possession is a 
necessary condition for external freedom, it is not the sufficient condition. The 
sufficiency condition would be satisfied only by establishing a public authority, that is, 
by entering a civil condition.   
Kant’s claim is that “it is possible to have something external as one’s own only 
in a rightful condition, under an authority giving laws publicly, that is, in a civil 
condition” (MM 6:255/409), or as he maintains further, “only in a civil condition can 
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something external be mine or yours” (MM 6:256/409). What is distinctive about a civil 
condition, according to Kant, is the “authority giving laws publicly,” the absence of 
which is what defines the state of nature. Hence, we expect to see why it is that without 
such a public authority, rightful possession cannot be realized.  
Kant begins his argument by repeating the obligatory character of the Postulate 
we already discussed:  
When I declare (by word or deed), I will that something external is to be 
mine, I thereby declare that everyone else is under obligation to refrain 
from using that object of my choice, an obligation no one would have 
were it not for this act of mine to establish a right (MM 6:255/409). 
The point is familiar in that any claim to possess an external object includes coercing 
others from using the object, and that others are obliged to refrain from using it. It is also 
clear that the Postulate—like the Universal Principle of Right and the innate right to 
freedom—is a universal principle. This means that the obligation and the coercion 
connected with the Postulate apply to all human beings. Because of this universality, 
everyone who has claimed an object as belonging to her already accepts that she is under 
the same obligation to refrain from using what belongs to others. Hence, Kant continues 
the argument by asserting that  
This claim involves, however, acknowledging that I in turn am under 
obligation to every other to refrain from using what is externally his; for 
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the obligation here arises from a universal rule having to do with external 
rightful relations (MM 6:255/409).  
Simply, if it is necessary for an agent to exclude everyone else from using an object, she 
does so based on the principle that this is necessary for everyone, including herself. 
So far in the argument, Kant has not added anything further to the Postulate. 
Rather, the important point added to the overall discussion is to exclude others forcefully 
from using our object, without a civil condition would amount to an infringement upon 
external freedom. This claim might seem to be surprising considering that the very 
Postulate we have been discussing so far is a demand of external freedom: the 
circumstance of res nullius is a violation of freedom. However, the rest of the argument 
interestingly reveals that without a civil condition, possessing external objects—and thus 
imposing force upon others to refrain from using them—would in turn result in a further 
violation of external freedom. Hence, even though rightfully possessing objects is a 
demand of external freedom, it is not possible to possess external objects unless there is a 
public lawgiving authority.  
The problem with rightful possession in the state of nature is that its coerciveness 
is unilateral. Kant asserts,  
A unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with regard 
to possession that is external and therefore contingent, since that would 
infringe upon freedom in accordance with universal laws (MM 6:256/409).  
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This is the crux of the relation between possession and the necessity of a civil condition 
in Kant’s thought, and thus must be elaborated.58  
Why is the unilaterality of a will to possess an external object a violation of 
external freedom, and therefore wrong? To see what exactly it would look like to exclude 
others unilaterally from using an object, we need to see the situation from the standpoint 
of the agent who is forced to refrain from using the object. Assume a situation in which 
there are only two agents. As was established by the Postulate, it is necessary to possess 
something if we are to decide independently from each other and thus retain our external 
freedom. Imagine that you claim a book to be yours. We both agree that if either of us 
possess something, we can exclude each other by use of force to refrain from using the 
object. From your standpoint, using force to exclude me from using your book is justified 
because otherwise your external freedom would be violated. Recall that coercion as 
hindering of a hindrance to freedom is justified. From your standpoint, you are simply 
coercing me in the sense that you are hindering my action that you deem as a hindrance 
to your freedom. However, from my standpoint, by using force to prevent me from using 
the book, you are restricting my freedom. I agreed at the outset that you have a right to 
possess some external object, yet I did not accept your claim to possess this book. This 
means that when you use force against me to keep your book away from me, you obstruct 
my action that from my standpoint is not a violation of your external freedom. 
                                                
58. In the following argument for why rightful possession would be an infringement upon external 
freedom, I am much in debt to Hodgson’s interpretation. For his argument, cf., “Kant on Property Rights 
and the State,” 72-76. 
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Consequently, your use of force against me—which is justified from your standpoint—is 
an infringement upon my external freedom: you are depriving me of exercising the action 
I have chosen for myself. Therefore, your using force against me is a unilateral coercion, 
which means that, unlike you, I do not agree with the judgment that such a force is 
justified.59 None of us can compel each other that our use of force against each other is 
justified because from our different standpoints we are restricting each other’s external 
freedom while at the same time we are protecting our own external freedom. This 
situation of unilateral coercion, therefore, is in principle a violation of external freedom, 
and thus is not rightful.60  
The non-justifiability of this unilateral use of force—unilateral possession—
amounts to the requirement for a reciprocal assurance between agents so that they all 
would be assured that their use of force against each other would be deemed as justified 
from the standpoint of all agents. Hence, Kant contends that,  
I am therefore not under obligation to leave external objects belonging to 
others untouched unless everyone else provides me assurance that he will 
behave in accordance with the same principle with regard to what is mine. 
This assurance does not require a special act to establish a right, but is 
                                                
59. Cf. also Kant’s brief argument in the Theory and Practice that in this unilateral situation, a 
person can decide nothing about another person that “could not be wrong” (TP 8:295/295).   
60. One can tell that the above line of argument is not fundamentally different from the argument I 
have used to established the vulnerability of the circumstance of res nullius. Both arguments rely on the 
fact that external freedom should not be violated. The only difference was the shift in the focus on different 
standpoints. Methodologically, this shift in the argument is plausible owing to the universality of the 
Postulate of rightful possession.  
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already contained in the concept of an obligation corresponding to an 
external right, since the universality, and with it the reciprocity, of 
obligation arises from a universal rule (MM 6:256/409).  
This requirement of the reciprocal assurance should not be surprising, as Kant is clear in 
the very articulation of the Universal Principle of Right that actions are right insofar as 
they can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law. That this 
principle of right holds universally for everyone implies the requirement of reciprocal 
assurance. The idea is simply that if I regard myself as being able to exclude others by the 
use of force from wronging me, I should also regard others as being able to do the same. 
However, as far as the use of force is unilateral, this requirement cannot be fulfilled. 
What is needed to fulfil the requirement of the reciprocal assurance, Kant argues, 
is a general will that puts everyone under such an obligation to refrain from wronging 
each other: 
So it is only a will putting everyone under obligation, hence only a 
collective general (common) and powerful will, that can provide everyone 
this assurance. But the condition of being under a general external (i.e., 
public) lawgiving accompanied with power is the civil condition. (MM 
6:256/409).  
The claim here is that what can resolve the problem arisen from the situation of merely 
unilateral coercion is a general, powerful, external authority that can justifiably—and 
universally—prevent agents from violating each other’s rights.  
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We should note that the problem of unilateral coercion cannot be solved merely 
through an agreement among agents that whenever one claims a possession, everyone 
should accept that the possessor is justified to use force against others. In other words, 
coercion is always unilateral in the absence of such a general, powerful, external 
authority. The reason is that without such an authority, the tension between the 
standpoints of the possessor and the excluded agent would remain. The excluded agent 
can still argue that, no matter how much a possessor regards herself as justified to use 
force and exclude others from using the possessed object, the possessor’s use of force is a 
violation of my external freedom. Therefore, the only way to escape from such a tension 
and exit the situation of merely unilateral coercions is the existence of a third party that 
can use force on behalf of every agent.  
Thus understood, the existence of the public authority as a third party does not 
mean that everyone should accept the boundaries between mine and yours. Rather, the 
authority can justifiably use force against those who do not accept those boundaries. In 
other words, the civil condition is not necessary to secure an agreement among people so 
that they respect each other’s rights. Instead, it is required so that the use of force against 
agents—which is per se a violation of the external freedom of agents—can be justified 
such that it would no longer be deemed as a violation of external freedom.  
How is this possible? The crucial difference between using force by a public 
authority and using force by individual agents needs to be emphasised. In a situation in 
which individual agents use force against each other, agents unilaterally follow their own 
judgements, which are in turn considered by other agents to be an infringement upon 
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their external freedom. The point was that from the standpoint of the excluded agent, the 
possessor’s use of force is an external unjustified coercion that restricts her choice. This 
leads to a requirement for a reciprocal assurance that is absent in such a situation. 
However, a public authority is not an individual agent whose use of force would be 
deemed by others as her own choice and thus as an external unjustified action. Instead, 
the public authority, by definition, is a third party whose task is to use force equally 
against any violations of rights, and thus provides the assurance that is missing in a 
situation of merely unilateral coercion. Therefore, in order to fulfil the demand of our 
right to be externally free, we need to be under a public lawgiving authority.  
I have been emphasising the problem of the non-justifiability of unilateral 
coercion as the main problem of the state of nature. However, there is also another 
problem that is termed in the literature as the problem of indeterminacy. This problem is 
that within the state of nature there is no boundary between mine and yours. In other 
words, the Postulate by itself does not determine what in concreto is mine and yours; 
rather, it only asserts that there must be a boundary, leaving the question of the exact 
determination of the limits between mine and yours unanswered.61 The point is that what 
is mine and yours cannot exist unless within a legal system.62 In the Drafts for the 
                                                
61. For an example of this interpretation cf. Pippin, “Mine and Thine? The Kantian State,”in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 433-437. Hodgson points out to this problem, but suggests that the main problem 
of the state of nature is the unjustifiability of using force by individual agents. He asserts that his 
interpretation is independent from the indeterminacy problem. Cf. Hodgson, “Kant on Property Rights and 
the State,” 75. I think the indeterminacy problem can be explained as a consequence of the deeper problem 
of unjustifiability of using force.  
62. Pippin, “Mine and Thine?” 438. 
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Metaphysics of Morals, Kant here and there refers to this problem.63 However, in the 
published text, as we have seen, he refers to the problem that unilateral coercion is an 
infringement upon external freedom.  
I think the problem of indeterminacy can be viewed as a consequence of the 
problem of the non-justifiability of unilateral coercion. That an agent does not regard the 
possessor’s use of force as justified is equivalent to the fact that she does not regard the 
possessed object as belonging to the possessor. This means that in a situation in which 
every agent has a similar standpoint towards each other, no one regards possessed objects 
as justifiably belonging to the claimants. In other words, the judgment that you are not 
justified to use force to exclude me from an object means that I do not recognize your 
claim to rightful possession. This means that from my standpoint the boundary you have 
set for yourself is not justified. And since everyone is in the unilateral situation of using 
force, everyone would take the same positon towards everyone else. This results in a 
situation in which every agent claims to have right to some certain external objects, and 
yet, no agent recognizes those claims as justified, and thus no agent would recognize the 
determined boundaries of mine and yours, rendering the claims null and void. Thus 
understood, the problem of indeterminacy in the state of nature is a consequence of the 
unjustifiability of using force by individual agents.  
Kant further adds that in the state of nature, external objects can actually be mine 
or yours, but only provisionally (MM 6:256/409). This assertion might seem to be 
                                                
63. For example, cf. DMM 23:215, 23:236, and 23:279. 
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confusing, considering that we have established that rightful possession, and thus using 
force against others to refrain from using our objects, is justified and possible only in a 
civil condition. Thus, it is crucial how to understand this provisionality of rightful 
possession in the state of nature. This assertion, as we shall see, has significant 
implications for Kant’s understanding of the state of nature and the duty to enter a civil 
condition. 
One way to read this assertion is to take the claim to be that people in the state of 
nature are temporarily justified to possess external objects, and thus are justified to use 
force against others to exclude them from their belongings.64 However, we have seen that 
Kant’s argument revolves around the point that such a use of force is not justified 
because it amounts to an infringement upon external freedom.  
 We should bear in mind that the Postulate, which asserts that possession must be 
possible, is an a priori principle that holds independently of a civil condition. The 
Postulate must be satisfied for rational beings to be externally free. Adding the point that 
such a rightful possession is provisionally possible in abstraction from a civil condition, 
Kant seems to have in mind an independence of the principle from the actual 
establishment of a civil condition. In other words, although rightful possession is possible 
only in a civil condition, its necessity holds a priori even without a civil condition. As 
Kant contends, “prior to a civil constitution (or in abstraction from it), external objects 
that are mine or yours must therefore be assumed to be possible” (MM 6:256/410). 
                                                
64. For an example of this interpretation, cf. Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, 
Ch. 4. 
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However, any claim of possession is comparatively rightful (MM 6:257/410), or as he 
elsewhere suggests, any possession is potential (DMM 23:258). The point, therefore, is 
that it is necessary to possess objects, and because of this necessity, agents claim that 
they possess certain external objects, but their claim is merely provisional, and their 
claimed belongings are merely potential. This provisionality emphasizes the fact that the 
unilateral will to possess something is susceptible to being deemed as unjustified by other 
agents. The only way to make rightful possession conclusive, then, is to enter a civil 
condition.  
Establishing that a civil condition is necessary because without it possession 
would be an infringement upon external freedom, Kant claims that it is a duty of right to 
enter a civil condition, which means we can justifiably force others to enter a civil 
condition. He asserts,  
If it must be possible, in terms of rights, to have an external object as 
one’s own, the subject must also be permitted to constrain everyone else 
with whom he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his 
or another’s to enter along with him into a civil constitution (MM 
6:256/409).  
This assertion seems to be puzzling because it leads us back to the claim that prior to a 
civil condition we can justifiably use force against others. As we saw, the crux of the 
argument for the necessity of the civil condition is exactly to prevent such individual use 
of force against each other. This seemingly paradoxical assertion needs to be clarified. 
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The problem of the duty to enter a civil condition needs a full elaboration of its 
own. In the literature, there is considerable debate about the kind of duty to enter a civil 
condition. Some endorse the view that such a duty is not enforceable, and thus cannot 
coherently be taken as a duty of right, because the duty is prior to a civil condition and in 
the absence of a public authority it cannot be enforceable. A public authority is a pre-
condition of enforcing the duties of right and itself cannot be a duty of right.65 
On the other hand, the division between the duties of rights and those of virtues 
suggests that if it is not a duty of right, it must be deemed an ethical duty. This means that 
the agents in the state of nature should make it their own duty, and should thus comply 
with it for the sake of the duty. This interpretation cannot be accepted. One reason is 
Kant’s own explicit assertion that the Universal Principle of Right, as the crucial 
principle that defines what is juridically right and what is juridically wrong and thus 
defines the duties of right, is not an ethical principle. I repeat his assertions regarding this 
principle: 
it cannot be required that I make it the maxim of my action… that I make it 
my maxim to act rightly is a demand that ethics makes on me… it does not 
at all expect, far less demand, that I myself should limit my freedom to 
those conditions just for the sake of this obligation; instead reason says 
only that freedom is limited to those conditions in conformity with the 
                                                
65. For example, cf., O’Neill, “Enactable and Enforceable,” 123-124.  
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idea of it and that it may also be actively limited by others (MM 
6:231/388).  
This implies that if a civil condition is necessary as a demand of external freedom, and as 
Kant asserts, if we can constrain others to leave the state of nature, then the duty to enter 
a civil condition cannot be a merely ethical duty, and thus can be rightfully enforced.  
As I said, the problem is a difficult one that needs a full elaboration of its own.66 
But for our present purpose, let us accept that the duty to enter a civil condition is a duty 
of right, meaning that entering a civil condition can be rightfully enforced. If this 
understanding is correct, we should bear in mind that this enforceability of leaving the 
state of nature is limited to a specific conception of “the state of nature.” This state of 
nature, to which Kant refers in his argument for the necessity of a civil condition, has the 
specific characteristic of being anticipatory. In other words, “the state of nature” from 
which, according to Kant, we can be forced to leave is a pre-civil condition, or as he 
                                                
66. A full elaboration of this problem needs to deal with two main problems among others. First, 
the very binding force of the duties of right—including the duty to enter a civil condition if we interpret it 
as a duty of right—needs to be explained. If the duties of right, as distinct from the duties of virtue, do not 
require that the agent obeys the duty for the sake of the duty itself, then we need to explain the 
prescriptivity of juridical laws. If the prescriptivity of the Universal Principle of Right is such that it does 
not require that we make it the principle of our actions, and as Kant asserts, “it cannot be required that I 
make it [i.e. the Universal Principle of Right] the maxim of my action,” (MM 6:231/388), then how can we 
explain the prescriptivity of the Principle? At least to consider the Principle as a prescription to agents, it 
seems that the agents should be aware of, and accept, such prescriptivity. A complete explanation of this 
problem can be found in Marcus Willaschek, “Which Imperatives for Right? On the Non-Prescriptive 
Character of Juridical Laws in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals,” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: 
Interpretative Essays, ed. Mark Timmons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 65-87. Second, the 
problem of the kind of duty to enter a civil condition needs an account of the concepts of duty and 
obligation of a community of people. It is obvious that, at least in the Groundwork in which one can find his 
complete theory of obligation, Kant explains duty and obligation as being addressed to individuals. 
However, a duty to enter a civil condition, if we take it as a duty addressing a community of people who 
ought to leave the state of nature together, requires an account of duty that cannot be done unless jointly by 
a community of people together. These two problems need to be explored in an independent research. 
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asserts “in anticipation of and preparation for the civil condition” (MM 6:257/410). It is 
in this state of nature that possession is provisional, waiting for an established public 
authority.  
Let us pause on this specific understanding of the state of nature. Two points need 
to be stressed. First, the state of nature from which we can be forced by others to leave is 
a pre-civil condition. When he refers to the provisionality of rightful possession in the 
state of nature, Kant asserts that  
Possession in anticipation of and preparation for the civil condition, which 
can be based only on a law of a common will, possession which therefore 
accords with the possibility of such a condition, is provisionally rightful 
possession (MM 6:257/410).  
The qualification of “in anticipation of and preparation for the civil condition” shows that 
what Kant has in mind about the state of nature is a circumstance in which there is a 
possibility of establishing a civil condition. Arranged in any probable way, in an 
anticipatory state of nature, there is a possibility of the civil condition. Therefore, Kant’s 
assertion that we can force people to enter a civil condition is an assertion only about 
such a circumstance of an anticipatory state of nature. Consequently, Kant’s contention 
that we can use force for entering a civil condition cannot be taken as a claim for an 
imagined state of nature, in which there is no prospect of establishing a civil condition. 
Furthermore, Kant clarifies what he means by this anticipatory state of nature 
when he asserts that “prior to entering such a condition [i.e. civil condition], a subject 
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who is ready for it resists with right those who are not willing to submit to it and who 
want to interfere with his present possession” (MM 6:257/410 [emphasis added]). As 
another example, in the Reflections, Kant contends that the proposition that one must 
leave the state of nature “means that one can force everyone to enter in status civilis {a 
civil condition} with us” (R 7735. 19:503 [emphasis added]). From these two assertions, 
we can understand that the justifiability of using force against some agents to enter a civil 
condition is when there is some unwilling agent who opposes the willingness of others to 
enter a civil condition. In other words, in a circumstance that for any reason there is the 
probability of establishing a civil constitution, if there are some resisting agents, others 
who are shaping the public authority can forcibly make the resistant agents to accept with 
them the authority of a public legal system.67  
This latter point reveals a further characteristic of Kant’s argument for the 
necessity of the public authority. The qualification that the state of nature at issue is an 
anticipatory condition, together with the assertion that we can force those who are not 
willing to enter with us—who are willing to enter—into a civil condition, indicates that 
the duty to enter a civil condition presupposes a pre-reflective awareness of at least the 
necessity of having external rights. Indeed, the requirement of the reciprocal assurance 
already indicates that agents come to the necessity of establishing a public authority if 
                                                
67. Thus understood, the duty to enter a civil condition is conditional on whether the state of 
nature is anticipatory in the sense I explained. We should keep in mind that the conditionality of this duty 
does not diminish the necessity of the civil condition. The point is emphasised by Bernd Ludwig in his 
“Whence Public Right? The Role of Theoretical and Practical Reasoning in Kant’s Doctrine of Right,” in 
Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, ed. Mark Timmons, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 179. 
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they are aware of their obligations to each other to keep their belongings untouched. 
Therefore, the justifiability of forcing people to enter a civil condition can be interpreted 
as limited to the kind of state of nature that is anticipatory for an established public 
authority.68  
Setting aside the difficult issue of the state of nature in which there is no prospect 
of a public authority, Kant’s contention is that the necessity of a civil condition is a 
dictate of our reason through the necessity of rightful possession if we are to be 
externally free. Therefore, if anyone intends to remain in the state of nature, and resists 
those who are entering a civil condition, she is doing wrong “in the highest degree” (MM 
6:307/452) and can be justifiably forced to enter with others into a civil condition. Hence, 
it is a duty of right to enter the condition that is necessary by virtue of the fact that we are 
rational beings with an innate right to freedom.  
                                                
68. If these characteristics does not exist in an imagined state of nature, the question of the 
justifiability of using force to enter people into a civil condition—or equivalently, the question of the kind 
of duty to leave the state of nature—gets more complex that goes beyond the scope of this research. I 
should merely mention in passing that Kant’s elaboration of the issue in the Perpetual Peace gives us a 
clue to the contention that the duty to leave the state of nature where there is no prospect of a civil 
condition—and thus there is no awareness of the necessity of a civil condition—cannot be easily said to be 
rightful or ethical. It is not ethical because the establishment of a civil condition is soluble “even for a 
nation of devils” (PP 8:366/335). Neither is it a duty of right, because in the case where there is no prospect 
of a civil union the use of force against people (to use Kant’s own example, such as the American Indians) 
is not authorized (MM 6:266/417). In the Perpetual Peace, Kant refers to a state of nature in which people 
ought to do what is required by the laws of freedom but for any reason they do not. In that case, Kant 
explains that nature does something that people ought to do but they do not. Although the establishment of 
a civil condition is a demand of reason, in a state of nature where there is no prospect of a civil union, 
nature “comes to the aid of the general will grounded in reason” (PP 8:366/335). Kant claims that nature 
does this through war that is based on the self-seeking inclinations of human beings. This latter assertion 
indicates that a Kantian account of the state of nature that is not an anticipation nor a preparation for a civil 
condition requires a different account, and probably investigating the history of human kind before the 
establishment of a civil condition. 
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One might object that if entering a civil condition is necessary because we are 
rational, free agents, then it does not seem plausible to claim that the duty to enter a civil 
condition is limited to those in an anticipatory state of nature explained above.69 If the 
establishment of a civil condition is a necessary dictate of reason, it must hold for every 
human being, no matter whether or not they are in an anticipatory state of nature. I should 
admit that my emphasis in this thesis on the rational necessity of the civil condition might 
be susceptible to this criticism. However, regarding this problem, I should emphasize two 
points that might be illuminating. First, the derivation of the concept of external freedom 
from the Principle of Rational Willing—explained in the first chapter—relied on the 
awareness of an agent of the indispensably necessary means to achieve her ends. I argued 
                                                
69. This problem has been addressed by Flikschuh in her interesting analysis of the duty to enter a 
civil condition in light of Kant’s denial of the justifiability of forcing nomads to leave the state of nature. 
Cf. Flikschuh, “Kant’s Nomads: Encountering Strangers,” Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of 
Philosophy n. 5, (2017): 346-348. Accessed June 2017. https://www.con-
textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/237. In the previous note, I mentioned Kant’s assertion 
about the unjustifiability of using force to enter American Indians—nomads—into a civil condition (MM 
6:266/417). Flikschuh focuses on this assertion and gives an account of the duty to enter a civil condition 
that is not universal (350). She argues that nomads—as people who are not under a public authority—and 
European settlers are not together in the state of nature. Furthermore, she argues that nomads do not raise 
property claims against each other. My suggestion that even in Kant’s own argument for the necessity of a 
civil condition, the state of nature to which Kant refers is an anticipatory state of nature and thus contains 
merely those who are willing and aware of the necessity and possibility of a civil condition would serve as 
a support for her claim about the non-enforceablity of entering a civil condition for nomads. Having said 
that, she also observes that if one infers the necessity of a civil condition from the claim that every person 
has the right to be externally free, one cannot explain Kant’s contention that forcing nomads to enter a civil 
condition is not justified. A full analysis of Flikschuh’s paper goes beyond the scope of this research. For a 
supporting argument for her conclusion, based on Kant’s distinctions between different modes of “holding-
to-be-true,” cf., James Scott Johnston, “Recursive Justification and Kant’s Civil Condition: Some 
Comments on Flikschuh’s Account of Nomadic Rights,” Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of 
Philosophy n. 5, (2017): 369-374. Accessed June 2017. https://www.con-
textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/238. For a criticism of the implications of Flikschuh’s 
paper, suggesting that Kant’s analysis of encountering with nomads is “a momentary acknowledgment of 
diversity,” not an endorsement of the justifiability of their culture, cf., Joël Madore, “Unsettling 
Encounters: A response to Katrin Flikschuh’s ‘Kant’s Nomads’,” Con-Textos Kantianos. International 
Journal of Philosophy n. 5, (2017): 375-383. Accessed June 2017. https://www.con-
textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/239. 
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that if we put ourselves under the practical necessity of the imperatives we give to 
ourselves, we cannot rationally accept to put ourselves at the same time under the 
authority of others to decide for us, and thus we must be able to act freely from another’s 
power of choice. In other words, external freedom would be necessary if human beings 
operate based on that account of rationality. This leaves an open space for the possibility 
of the existence of some human beings that do not operate based on that account of 
rationality. In other words, it is not logically impossible to imagine a species of human 
beings who either would not act based on the practical necessity of the rules they give to 
themselves, or would not deem both the necessity of their own-imposed rules and being 
under the constraint of others as unacceptable. How the rationality of this imagined 
species of human beings operates would be another issue. My main claim was the 
narrower claim that if human beings are rational in the sense I proposed, then external 
freedom cannot be dispensed with. Therefore, if any group of human beings can 
consistently act without being externally free, the establishment of a public political 
authority would not be necessary for them. 
Second, in the argument for the necessity of the civil condition, I emphasized that 
a unilateral use of force against others to refrain from using a possessed object is not 
justified because an agent who is forced to refrain would deem that unilateral use of force 
as unjustified. Thus, the agent seeks for a reciprocal assurance that is not given unless by 
a public authority. This requirement of assurance with regard to the obligations that 
agents have towards each other implies that they are aware of the necessity of the rightful 
possession. They know that without rightfully being able to exclude others from using 
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some certain external objects they would not be able to act freely from others’ 
constraints. The important point is that the establishment of a civil condition becomes 
necessary only if agents regard the situation of unilateral possession as unjustified. 
Consequently, if there is a group of human beings who can live without possessing 
anything,70 or for any reason, who would not deem a situation of unilateral possession as 
unjustified, entering a civil condition would not be an enforceable duty. 
Conclusion 
Freedom, as independence from being constrained by another choice, is the 
fundamental concept through which Kant argues for the necessity of a civil condition. In 
this chapter, I started with explaining the role of the concept of freedom in Kant’s theory 
of right. I argued for the priority of this concept over the Universal Principle of right, 
which defines the rightfulness of actions when people interact with each other. Moreover, 
I argued that through this concept we can justify the use of coercion, which is distinctive 
of the duties of right as distinct from the duties of virtue. The first section, thus, clarified 
the concept of freedom within the domain of rights. In the second section, I proceeded to 
argue that without possessing external objects, human beings cannot be externally free. 
Thus, the right to freedom, I argued, demands the necessity of rightful possession so that 
the possessors can rightfully force others to refrain from using their belongings. Rightful 
possession by itself, however, is not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of the right to 
freedom, as it might lead to an infringement upon freedom. Thus, in the third section, I 
                                                
70. For Flikschuh’s argument that nomads are not familiar with the category of property, cf. 
“Kant’s Nomads,” 356.   
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presented Kant’s argument for the necessity of a civil condition, understood as a public 
lawgiving authority, if we are to be externally free. Having established that a civil 
condition is necessary if we are to be externally free, I have completed the second step of 
my main claim in this thesis that a civil condition is necessary because of our being 
rational, free agents.  
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Conclusion 
A Kantian answer to the problem of political obligation, that is the problem of 
providing a justification for why human beings are to obey legal and political authorities, 
is distinctive in that it provides a non-instrumental account of such an obligation. A 
political authority, from a Kantian standpoint, is not required merely because it comes 
with some benefits that would result in a better condition of life for human beings. 
Rather, it is necessary because we are rational, free agents. My main purpose in this 
thesis was to provide arguments for this non-instrumental Kantian contention regarding 
the necessity of a civil condition.  
To support this contention, I started with a derivation of the concept of external 
freedom from a Kantian theory of rational, free agency, since the crucial concept by 
which Kant justifies the existence of a political authority is the concept of external 
freedom, that is freedom in the external use of choice. With the first chapter, I intended to 
show that external freedom is not a mere unjustified presupposition Kant has about 
human beings. External freedom is not a given value that we should promote in political 
and social organizations. Instead, external freedom understood as independence from 
being constrained by another’s choice—or alternatively as my right to decide for my 
actions myself and not to be decided upon by others—is a demand of our being rational 
beings. To argue for this claim, I relied on a Kantian theory of rational agency, in which 
the emphasis is that the products of our practical reason—that is, the imperatives issued 
by reason—come with a necessity that we impose upon ourselves. I argued that we 
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cannot consistently accept on the one hand that we are rationally bound to these 
necessities, and on the other hand that our decisions can be arbitrarily made by other 
human beings. In other words, I suggested the concept of external freedom as a 
requirement to overcome an unavoidable obstacle on our compliance with the demands of 
reason. The obstacle I took to be the external obstacle of others deciding for my actions.  
Having suggested that external freedom is required to assure us against 
obstruction by others that we can comply with the practical necessities of our reason-
issued rules, I turned to the Universal Principle of Right as Kant’s suggested principle 
that regulates our interactions with each other. The core concept by which Kant provides 
this principle is the concept of external freedom. The Principle defines the rightfulness of 
actions as those actions that do not violate another’s right to freedom. Moreover, what 
distinguishes the rightful duties we have to refrain from wronging our fellow human 
beings accompanies an authorization to coercion. This use of force to prevent others from 
wronging us is justified through the concept of external freedom. The idea is that if 
limiting freedom—according to the Universal Principle of Right—is a wrong action, it 
can be justifiably limited by the use of force, because limiting a limitation of freedom is 
equivalent with securing external freedom. This coerciveness of rightful obligations is the 
crucial criterion that Kant uses to distinguish the domain of rights from ethics. Therefore, 
the concept of external freedom can also serve as what establishes Kant’s proposed 
distinction between rights and ethics.  
However, as we have seen, the Universal Principle of Right does not suffice to 
assure our right to freedom. Rightful possession is interestingly required if we are to be 
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externally free. Thus, in the second section of the second chapter, I argued that without 
rightful possession, the demand of our right to freedom cannot be fulfilled. The main 
point is that, if we cannot rightfully possess external objects, that is if we may not 
forcibly exclude others from using the objects belonging to us, we cannot be externally 
free. Kant’s argument for this tenet is provided in what he calls “The Postulate of 
Practical Reason with Regard to Rights,” that asserts that a circumstance in which 
external objects may not be possessed is fundamentally an infringement upon our 
freedom. Thus understood, possession is not an instrumental innovation of human beings 
because they need to use external objects. Instead, possession is required a priori and 
independently from any empirical aspect of human life, merely because it is a demand of 
our external freedom.  
In the final section, then, I argued for the necessity of a public lawgiving 
authority. The interesting point was that even though rightful possession is a necessary 
condition for our right to freedom, it is not a sufficient condition. The reason, I argued, is 
that without a civil condition, rightful possession is not possible, because it would in 
principle infringe upon our freedom. The problematic of rightful possession outside a 
civil condition is that it is a merely unilateral use of force to exclude others from using 
the possessed objects. This unilateral use of force, I argued, would always be deemed to 
be unjustified from the standpoint of the agent who is forced to refrain from using the 
possessed object. This situation of unilateral coercion, according to Kant, can be solved 
merely by a condition in which there is a public authority that provides the reciprocal 
assurance that agents need to deem the use of force as justified. This public authority 
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plays the role of a third party whose function is to assure that the use of force to exclude 
others from using the possessed objects will be always reciprocal. Therefore, by 
establishing that freedom in the external use of choice is a demand of our rationality, and 
the civil condition is a demand of our freedom in the external use of choice, I concluded 
that the civil condition is a demand of our rationality. 
It is important to note in closing that in this thesis and in Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Morals, the problem of political obligation, or the question of why we ought to obey 
laws, is asked from within a civil condition. In other words, our experience of political 
authority precedes asking the question. However, this experiential context is essential to 
the question, as the very experience of living under a political authority accompanies with 
an ambivalence between, on the one hand, being satisfied with the protections provided 
by the authority, and on the other hand feeling the imposition of such an authority as an 
obstruction to one’s free exercise. We cannot live collectively without a political system 
regulating us; yet we cannot overlook our occasionally dissatisfaction with the decisions 
made by that system. This discomforting ambivalence, this being shadowed by a political 
authority—experiencing the authority both as protection and darkness—fuels asking the 
question of political obligation, causing us to feel the particular uneasiness of inquiring 
into an answer for the question.  
 I have taken Kant’s arguments to provide a satisfactory answer to the inquiry. 
However, this answer also comes with its own sense of uneasiness, a response to which 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis. The claim I have defended is that living outside 
a civil condition would result in irrationalities that we as free human beings could not 
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consistently endorse. The account of rationality I provided here, though it shows the 
systematic character of Kant’s thought, leaves us with uneasiness when we consider that 
some human beings may not operate according to this account of rationality. What about 
those human beings who can accept the alleged “irrationality” of acting and choosing 
without being externally free? Furthermore, I have argued that the civil condition is 
necessary for those who live in an anticipatory state of nature, a claim that limits Kant’s 
argument to those who are aware of the necessity of the civil condition. But what about 
those who live in a state of nature that is not waiting for a civil condition to-come?  
Let us not take the answer provided in this research—that a civil condition is 
necessary because we are rational, free beings—to be an end to the ambivalent 
discomfort of being shadowed by a political authority. Proving the necessity of the 
establishment of a state, especially with the emphasis on its non-instrumental character, 
allows us to feel more comfortable with being shadowed by the regulating, protective 
laws in our collective life. And deriving such a necessity from our rational character 
seems to strengthen the uneasiness of that shadowing. Perhaps in another possible world, 
in a world in which our “rationality” was different, we would never bother to answer the 
question of political obligation, or we would find some justifications for the condition of 
our life without a political authority. Perhaps, in that case, our “political philosophy” 
would be different: within an existing civil condition a political philosopher thinks 
differently from outside.  
 
 
83 
References 
Primary Sources 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer 
and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Kant, Immanuel. Immanuel Kant: Gesammelte Schriften (Akademie-Ausgabe), I-
XXIII. Electronic Edition. Band 6. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Past Masters. 1999. 
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy. Edited and 
translated by Frederick Rauscher and Kenneth R. Westphal. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016.  
Kant, Immanuel. Practical Philosophy. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Secondary Sources 
Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A 
Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990.  
Allison, Henry. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.  
Flikschuh, Katrin. “Kant’s Nomads: Encountering Strangers.” Con-Textos 
Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy n. 5, (2017): 346-348. Accessed June 
2017. https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/237 
Flikschuh, Katrin. Kant and Modern Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000.  
Gregor, Mary J. Laws of Freedom; a Study of Kant's Method of Applying the 
Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik Der Sitten. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963. 
Grier, Michelle. Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
 
84 
Guyer, Paul. “Kant’s Deduction of the Principles of Right.” In Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, edited by Mark Timmons, 23-64. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Hodgson, Louis-Philippe. “Kant on Property Rights and the State” Kantian 
Review 15, no. 1 (2010): 57-87. 
Hodgson, Louis-Philippe. “Kant on the Right to Freedom: A Defense” Ethics 120, 
(2010): 791-819.   
Johnston, James Scott. “Recursive Justification and Kant’s Civil Condition: Some 
Comments on Flikschuh’s Account of Nomadic Rights.” Con-Textos Kantianos. 
International Journal of Philosophy n. 5, (2017): 369-374. Accessed June 2017. 
https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/238.  
Kersting, Wolfgang. “Politics, Freedom, and Order: Kant’s Political Philosophy.” 
In The Cambridge Companion to Kant, edited by Paul Guyer, 342-366. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
Ludwig, Bernd. “Whence Public Right? The Role of Theoretical and Practical 
Reasoning in Kant’s Doctrine of Right.” In Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative 
Essays, edited by Mark Timmons, 159-183. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Madore, Joël. “Unsettling Encounters: A response to Katrin Flikschuh’s ‘Kant’s 
Nomads’.” Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy n. 5, (2017): 375-
383. Accessed June 2017. https://www.con-
textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/239 
O’Neill, Onora. “Enactable and Enforceable: Kant’s Criteria for Right and 
Virtue.” Kant-Studien 107, no. 1 (2017): 111-124. 
Pippin, Robert B. “Mine and Thine? The Kantian State.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, edited by Paul Guyer, 416-446. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Reath, Andrews. “Kant’s Critical Account of Freedom.” In A Companion to Kant, 
edited by Graham Bird, 275-290. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.   
Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.  
Uleman, Jennifer K. “External Freedom in Kant's "Rechtslehre": Political, 
Metaphysical.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, no. 3 (2004): 578-601. 
 
 
85 
Weinrib, J. Ernest. “Law as Idea of Reason.” In Essays on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy, edited by Howard Williams, 15-49. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1992. 
Westphal, Kenneth R. “A Kantian Justification of Possession.” In Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, edited by Mark Timmons, 89-109. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Willaschek, Marcus. “Which Imperatives for Right? On the Non-Prescriptive 
Character of Juridical Laws in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals.” In Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Morals: Interpretative Essays, edited by Mark Timmons, 65-87. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002.  
Wood, Allen. “The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy.” In Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, edited by Mark Timmons, 1-21. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002.  
